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This project examines the motivational structures of military service, focusing on the 
Vietnam War. By plumbing the minds of the war’s veterans, it seeks to identify the 
process by which soldiers consent to military service both before and during their service, 
and if differences in Military Operational Specialty correlate with different motivations 
for consent.  
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I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
   Back by Wilfred Gibson 
 
They ask me where I’ve been, 
And what I’ve done and seen. 
But what can I reply 
Who know it wasn’t I, 
But someone just like me, 
Who went across the sea 
And with my head and hands 
Killed men in foreign lands… 
Though I must bear the blame, 
Because he bore my name. 
 
 
Describing one’s remembrance of military service as an out of body experience – 
for which one has many memories, except that of being in control – is as poignant in this 
 8 
work as it is disturbing. In all likelihood, Gibson’s poem truly resonates only with those 
who felt a similar sentiment after their own military service. Yet, perhaps everyone, at 
some point in their lives, has shared the feeling of dissociation of self from remembered 
behavior.  
To abstract briefly away from the context of militarism, this thesis proceeds from 
a general philosophical premise and question. If linking a cause to a result is the keystone 
of writing historical accounts of human existence, then some results mustn’t be limited to 
a single cause.1 As E.H. Carr writes in What Is History?, “[t]he true historian, confronted 
with a list of causes … would feel professional compulsion to reduce it to order, to 
establish some hierarchy of causes which would fix their relation to one another.” 
While admitting the importance of a gamut of causes for one result, this historian will 
acknowledge the primacy of one cause, Carr’s “cause of all causes.”2 
Enter the general philosophical question: are we as humans responsible for the 
decisions we make? Does our free will act as the “cause of all causes,” in our behavior? 
Surely there are a wide number of factors that contribute to any discrete instance of 
human behavior, but in endorsing Carr’s conception of aetiology can we put the 
individual firmly at the top of the “hierarchy of causes?” This question has baffled 
philosophers for centuries, and I would be a fool to believe this thesis might contribute 
substantially to that general debate. Rather, I will focus on a very specific context 
populated by very specific actors, and attempt to answer this question from that 
perspective.                                                         
1 Though a profitable discussion of the matter might well be pertinent in another conversation, this thesis 
will eschew the Humean objection to the shaky conceptual ground of causation and proceed as thought it 
were a valid concept.  
2 Carr, What is History, 117 
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In the early 1940s, Howard Zinn, the future academic and staunch opponent 
of most American wars, volunteered for service in the American Air Force to fight in 
WWII. He viewed the atrocities committed by Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich as so 
execrable that he felt personally compelled to stop them. Disregarding the effects of his 
experience as a bomber pilot in Europe,3 Zinn portrays what I’ll call the ideal scenario for 
consenting to military service: a conscious decision to serve based on the association of 
service with the fulfillment of ones underlying ethical and moral principles. When the 
execution of these principles coheres with the military agenda of one’s own belligerent 
government, (as they did for Zinn) one can be aptly described as an ideal consenter to 
military service. 
In contrast, let’s turn to the military career of another famous academic. In 1914, 
a young Ludwig Wittgenstein greeted news of the war not with nationalistic fervor or 
moral resonance, but with a highly more insular flavor of consent. One of his many 
biographers Ray Monk captures the famous thinker’s feelings well: “in some sense, he 
welcomed the war… Like many of his generation, Wittgenstein felt that the experience of 
facing death would, in some way or other, improve [sic] him. He went to war, not for the 
sake of country, but for the sake of himself.”4 Though Wittgenstein still consents to 
service, his reasons could not be further from those of Zinn as described above. If Zinn 
displays ideal reasons for wanting to fight in a war, Wittgenstein occupies the other end 
                                                        
3 Which would turn Zinn against the war effort and the idea of war in general.  
4 Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, 112 
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of the spectrum. He is completely disengaged from the broad ideological weight of the 
war, desiring participation only as a darkly therapeutic endeavor.5  
The key word in the above passage is ideal. Consenters are an ideal toward which 
every government that wants to generate voluntary military service from its citizenry 
strives. To put Zinn’s experience to the “hierarchy of causes” test, we can be relatively 
comfortable positioning his own free will at the highest point. Surely he was influenced 
by exterior factors, but his decision was primarily motivated by his own conception of 
right and wrong, which ideally synched up with the military agendum of his government. 
Wittgenstein’s free will can be similarly placed, but for different reasons.  
However, as military historian Peter Karsten illustrates in his essay, consent 
theory comes nowhere close to explaining every such decision of national military 
service. In fact, it explains only a small portion of such behavior. In discussing the 
problems with consent theory he writes, “[t]he theory [sic] is that young men, conscious 
of the freedoms and rights they possess in democratic societies, will freely consent to 
military service with a sense of political obligation.”6As he goes on to argue in the 
article, this theory is just that: a theory having imperfect observable support throughout 
history. Some soldiers no doubt agree with their government’s military agenda, some 
perhaps not. More interestingly, some may have no opinion on the political aspect of the 
war, and are involved for different and more complicated reasons. 
In keeping with the stark limits of consent theory, the initial examples of Zinn and 
Wittgenstein were intentionally simplistic demonstrations of consent, intentionally 
                                                        
5 Indeed, Wittgenstein believed that German/Austrian involvement in the war was futile against what he 
believed to be a superior English enemy. He would nonetheless serve on the Russian front.  
6 Karsten, “Consent and the American Soldier,” 42 
 11 
divorced from the cultural contexts into which they were born and in which they grew up. 
A consideration of these contexts need be made if we are to make a more informative 
argument about just how young men (and women) make the decision to fight for their 
countries. Considering the surrounding context, we need to reformulate the notion of 
causation developed by E.H. Carr, and thus that of free will that I’ll use in this paper. 
Men who can be placed as the “cause of all causes” in their consent to military service 
cannot occupy this position alone. They bear with them their upbringings, their 
socialization processes and memories. More importantly, as I’ll demonstrate in this 
project, for some soldiers, these contexts (and thus, their motivations) change between 
the time that they consent to service and the experience of combat in the field.  
 
 
i. Walter Sobchak & The Audacity of History 
 
 
“What the fuck does anything have to do with Vietnam?”7 
-The Dude (Jeff Bridges) 
 
The Dude’s question, mutatis mutandis, is one that must be asked of any historian 
studying a given period of history, and must be satisfactorily answered if the historian is 
to have the right to study that period. The methodology of this project is my answer to 
this question, and I sincerely hope it stirs inside the reader the same interest in the 
                                                        
7 Joel Coen, The Big Lebowski,  
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Vietnam War and in history in general that I have. Before discussing the question of my 
methodology proper, I should like to make a broad comment on its scope.  
History proceeds by moments, each flowing logically, if sometimes opaquely, but all 
the while gracefully into each other in simple temporal rhythm. Moments establish, 
preserve, and are in large part defined by certain trends and forces the birth and death of 
which mark the moment’s beginning and end. The dregs of these forces then metastasize 
into a new moment bearing distinctions from yet still evocative of their predecessors. 
Reconstruction in the post-Civil War American South, Russia in the months before and 
after the revolutions of 1917, Prussia during the political career of Otto von Bismarck and 
the subsequent unification of Germany: these are all what I call historical moments. Some 
moments are interesting and thus prompt in-depth studies; others are boring and are thus 
neglected by historians. Likewise, the Vietnam War is a historical moment, one that I 
deem to be worthy of attention. 
My study of the Vietnam War stems from a deep-seated interest in the war as an 
important piece of American history, an important player in our national memory. 
Nonetheless, studying the Vietnam War, or historical moments in general, teaches us (if 
nothing else) that moments must not be studied in isolation of any other historical 
context. To do this, to place an ultimate determinacy on one historic moment, so that all 
preceding events are seen as leading inevitably to it, and all subsequent events can be 
explained entirely by it, is the height of historical ignorance; it borders on the 
pathological. Indeed, it is precisely this kind of behavior that is exhibited by another 
character in The Big Lebowski (to whom the epigrammatic question is asked): Walter 
Sobchak, played by John Goodman. To hilarious effect, Walter interprets most events in 
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the film (set in the early 1990s) in terms of how they are motivated by the Vietnam War, 
going so far as to lament how another sybaritic and debt-ridden character in the film is a 
direct affront to his fallen comrades. Everything in Walter’s life is thus linked, by some 
supremely benighted logic, to the Vietnam War. Confronted with this kind of one-track 
thinking, The Dude’s expletive-laden exasperation cannot be surprising.  
In contrast to Walter’s severely limited understanding of history and its uses, my 
methodology studies cultures, peoples, and motivations as trans-historical realities, while 
using the Vietnam War as a case-in-point. In other words, historical moments are 
important, but to invest too much of one’s attention in one moment vitiates the overall 
effort of seeking the truth of the past. This project attests to that truism of history, and its 
methodology examines how certain definitive trends and forces in American history 
weave themselves into and out of the moment of the Vietnam War.  
 
The selection of the Vietnam War is no accident. In many ways, every war is bad, 
but one can make a good argument that the Vietnam War was the worst in United States 
history if for no other reason than its unsuccessful conclusion. To be sure, there are other 
large-scale wars in our nation’s history that have also not resulted in victory (e.g. the War 
of 1812), but none seem to have grown into more of an incubus on our national memory 
than has Vietnam.8 Our defeat there was especially damming to the consciousness of the 
American public, who had grown used to defeating enemy armies as powerful as the 
German Wehrmacht and as frightening as Japanese kamikazes. Over the course of the 
                                                        
8 As I’ll argue later on, much of this status has been fuelled by inaccurate representations of the Vietnam 
War in American media outlets and historical accounts. These should be taken into consideration when 
comparing its historical status to other important moments of American history.  
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war, “[t]he wealthiest and most powerful nation in the history of the world made a 
maximum military effort, with everything short of atomic bombs, to defeat a nationalist 
revolutionary movement in a tiny, peasant country – and failed.”9 The war’s status as the 
pariah in our military history thus gives me an added reason to study it, and to study the 
motivations of soldiers to fight in a war that brought overwhelming national and 
international shame to their nation, and in some cases to themselves.10 
Lastly, I would like to establish one final philosophical underpinning of the project: 
the audacity of history as a mode of knowledge. History proceeds as an audacious 
exercise, simply because it makes a claim to present the truth of the past. Historian Peter 
Novick expresses a concomitant duty of such a claim, saying that11 
[t]he assumptions on which [historical objectivity] rests include a commitment to the 
reality of the past, and to truth as correspondence to that reality; a sharp separation 
between knower and known, between fact and value, and above all between history 
and fiction. Historical facts are seen as prior to and independent of interpretation: the 
value of an interpretation is judged by how well it accounts for the facts; if 
contradicted by the facts, it must be abandoned… Whatever patterns exist in history 
are 'found', not 'made'. 
I would qualify this statement in the following way, pace considerations made by 
quantum physicists of observer effects: historical patterns exist apart from human 
knowledge. In this sense, none can be ‘made’ after such a time as they have already                                                         
9 Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States, 347 
10 It ought to be mentioned here that service in the Vietnam War, for many veterans, was not a harrowing 
experience, but rather a necessary evil that effectively uplifted their feelings of national pride and identity. 
The reasons that the war would become so unpopular in the minds of generations to come likely had little 
effect on their own conceptualizations of their service, and rightly so.  
11 Novick, That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession, 1-2 
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occurred. However, knowledge of these patterns is indeed ‘made’ by historians in the 
minds of their readers. Thus, a historian’s responsibility is not only to the truth of the 
facts he or she includes in an account, but also to the accuracy of the picture these facts in 
concert make. In interacting with a dormant corpus of historical facts, a retrospective 
account presented by any historian will bear flaws and imperfections simply in virtue of 
the phenomenology of retrospective observation.  
When dealing with anything as complex and multi-layered as a society’s past, any 
historical account is bound to focus more on some aspects and less on others, to omit 
inadvertently (or intentionally) what may well prove to be important information for a 
complete understanding of the past. No historian can escape this occupational hazard of 
his or her trade. However, this project attempts to make a small step toward a better 
understanding of the Vietnam War, and provides an account of the voices that don’t often 
make it into its conventional tellings.  
This project is no exception. I do not presume to present a complete history of the 
Vietnam War here, nor even a comprehensive account of why ‘we’ fought it.12 However, 
through historical studies that bear an awareness of this immutable weakness of the 
academic field, we can find answers to historical questions that are certainly better than 
the orthodoxies that have been passed down. This is the work of the historian.  
 
 
 
                                                         
12 Indeed, the ‘we’ used in the project’s title is intentionally vague. I use it to draw the reader into a more 
vigorous consideration of just who did the fighting in Vietnam.  
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ii. Talk the Talk 
 
 
Before I delve into my methodology, I’ll establish the importance of the evidence 
I am using with a discussion of language and its importance to the Vietnam veteran both 
then and now. Paul Budra and Michael Zeitlin put together an expansive and exegetical 
book on the use of oral narrative by Vietnam veterans in their memoirs entitled Soldier 
Talk: The Vietnam War in Oral Narrative. It captures just how Vietnam veterans 
developed a language that they could use to show membership in a certain social group, 
and to display the effects of the war on themselves. If discrete sets of languages are 
indeed forms of life, then the rarefied language in which these soldiers spoke cannot be 
dismissed in such an expository project on Vietnam veterans. This section aims to 
describe just how Vietnam veterans used this rarefied language while both in country and 
in recreating their experiences through memoir. Before we can walk the walk, we must 
learn how to talk the talk.  
This project is colored, constituted, by the subjectivities of others. As some 
authors are more willing to attest than others, the memoirs cited in this project are not 
what might be called an impartial history. They are, like any historical account, 
necessarily subjective, necessarily and perhaps even unwittingly omitting certain 
materials from what is included in the relation of past characters and events. Nonetheless, 
talking about their experiences, their feelings, and their perspective on the war was an 
absolutely essential part of many Vietnam veterans’ tours.  As Budra and Zeitlin assert at 
the beginning of their book: "[t]alk for the Vietnam combatant, is cheap, a way of 
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releasing tension, of articulating fantasies of freedom from a military hierarchy that is 
opaque and capricious."13 Indeed, the book proceeds "from the axiom that everything 
said by the historical witness conveys a form of ‘the truth’ even when the speaker is 
consciously or unconsciously lying; even the lies or misrepresentations point us in the 
direction of the underlying truths to which they indirectly refer or attempt to negate."14 
However, despite the tendency among veterans to exaggerate to their liking their 
experiences in the telling, the role of this use of language is highly social and mentally 
salutary.  
 Solder talk was both a way to ease the pains of war, and, for the soldiers whose 
voices perhaps didn’t matter on most other topics, a chance to present the first draft of the 
history of the Vietnam War. These memoirists operate under the assumption that15  
language, in wartime especially, is inherently opaque and metaphorical, capable 
of absorbing heavy loads of paretic sentiment or ideological abstraction, and if, 
moreover, the media in war is more or less controlled or intimidated by a central 
command structure pursuing its own interests, then language itself is one of the 
primary battle sites of the war. 
This project then, operating under this definition of language in the historical context of 
the Vietnam War, strikes a blow for the a-conventional, and what were at many times 
starkly anti-conventional, voices of the war. These voices, I submit, while perhaps given 
to various exaggerations and fluctuations, offer the truest rendering of the war possible. 
For, it was their owners who did the lion’s share of the fighting and the dying. While 
                                                        
13 Budra and Zeitlin, Soldier Talk, 1 
14 Budra and Zeitlin, Soldier Talk, 11 
15 Budra and Zeitlin, Soldier Talk, 7 
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infantrymen often function without the perspective of grand strategy and overall moral 
cause, they bring viscerality to the historical account which no one without direct combat 
experience can. Ernest Hemingway, in A Farewell to Arms, touches upon the specific 
perspective of the foot soldier and the accompanying alienation he feels from the official 
accounts of the war. To his character Henry, “[a]bstract words such as glory, honor, 
courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the number of 
roads, the names of rivers, the number of regiments and the dates.”16 He detests the 
attempts of those who have not lived through the war as he has to make feeble attempts at 
encapsulating in trite banalities what he has experienced first hand. From his perspective, 
only the soldier who has seen the war close-up has the right to testify. Such a reaction to 
official accounts of the war would not be inappropriate to apply to the infantrymen in 
Vietnam. 
 And, if the soldier talk was a closer medium to the niceties of the war, it was also 
an identifiably, and deliberately, foul-mouthed one. As a tool of social identity in 
Vietnam, "obscene talk … is to be understood as a kind of insurrection against an official, 
sanitized account that shies away from the real obscenity of war."17 As we’ll see, there 
are examples of this in the memoirs included, but another reference to literature from 
another war seems pertinent. In The Naked and the Dead, Norman Mailer includes the 
watered-down curse word “fug” numerous times to identify his account as an attack on 
the sanitized language of others. In responding to what he deems an impertinent question 
about an assault mission, one soldier asks: “[w]hat the fug you caaeh? Ya yella?”18 
                                                        
16 Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms, 148 
17 Budra and Zeitlin, Soldier Talk, 8 
18 Mailer, The Naked and the Dead, 267 
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Clearly, Mailer is employing a decidedly a-conventional language in which to transcribe 
the experience of war on its most minute level. Similar behavior is observable in many 
individual accounts of service in the Vietnam War.  
 The language in these historical accounts, both in how it sounds and how it is 
used, provides the background against which each memoir should be judged. While no 
single memoir captures precisely ‘what happened’ in Vietnam, each one deserves careful 
consideration. If nothing else, each memoir gives us a glimpse into the past as one man 
saw it, and can help us further approximate the truth.  
 
 
iii. Methodology 
 
 
In keeping with this value of memoir, my methodology consists of reading memoirs 
and surveying veterans of the war. The bibliography is made up mostly of memoirs of the 
Vietnam War, but there are some other books added to contextualize the project both in 
terms of the history of the country and the war, and also in terms of war memoirs in 
general.  
The other section of my project consists of a broad survey I conducted of veterans of 
the war. In seeking to answer the questions that a war like this one raises, I thought it best 
to go straight to the source, straight to the men who fought it, and ask them about their 
experiences. In so doing, I hoped I could answer questions that might give me a better 
idea, not of why the United States government thought it a good idea to enter this war, 
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but why in the most minute detail (in terms of the decision-making process of individual 
soldiers) this war was fought.  
 The survey period spanned about 6 months, in which I contacted different 
veterans’ organizations throughout the country (Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vietnam 
Veterans of America, etc.) and distributed the surveys to those that were willing to 
participate. Overall, I received survey data from organizations throughout the continental 
United States (Pennsylvania, Texas, and California were especially heavy in respondents) 
and from a wide swath of different MOS’s. In the data listed in this project, I have 
grouped the respondents into two categories of “infantry” and “non-infantry” positions, 
so as to make the distinction between their responses clear. All of the chapters from 
which I received responses are listed in Appendix A of this project. The complete list of 
questions and responses can be found in Appendices B and C, respectively.  
The survey was distributed and compiled online, so that I could collect information 
from as wide a swath of the country as possible. For the organizations that indicated they 
would be willing to participate, the response rate per organization was about 17% or the 
membership of each organization that had access to the survey. This perhaps would have 
been higher were the survey available in a paper format, but I am pleased nonetheless 
with the response rate that I got.19As I indicate in the tables in Sections III/IV, I received 
394 surveys from veterans who saw regular combat (infantry), and 1084 from those who 
did not.  
                                                        
19 This data pool is, of course, potentially skewed towards only those veterans who have adapted towards 
using new technology, but I don’t believe an overrepresentation among this demographic would be harmful 
to the accuracy of the data collected. 
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One comment must be made here about the accuracy of the information I received. It 
is entirely possible that, 40+ years removed from their service, these men were 
misremembering the motivations and specific details of their time in Vietnam. Even more 
disquieting, the question of veracity must be posed. In Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam 
Generation Was Robbed of its Heroes and its History, B.G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley 
exhibit cases of Vietnam veterans claiming to have performed much more glamorous or 
dangerous duties while in country, when in fact they hadn’t. The surveys style of this 
project’s methodology does not lend itself to being sure about the truth of what the 
respondents were saying, so we must give them the benefit of the doubt in this respect. 
That the results of this project cohere with other, independent research (cited later) 
supports the reliability of its data.  
 
In conclusion, this distinction between a country’s government and its soldiery in 
relation to motivation is an important one for the project. It cues me into the complexities 
at play in human decision-making, and evolves into a richer and more accurate picture of 
the Vietnam War. In more specific terms, I distributed a survey gauging the thoughts and 
judgments of Vietnam veterans on the war and on their part in it, knowing full well that 
these may have changed over their years as a civilian. Nevertheless the graphical 
information provided by these surveys gives a great empirical basis to the stories that 
veterans have told in their memoirs.  
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II. MEDIA, MEMORY, AND HISTORICAL SYMBOLS 
 
 
 
 
 “Memory believes before knowing remembers.” 
-William Faulkner 
 
"I believe that there is a sense in which we have all been to Vietnam and even a 
sense in which we linger there today. This Vietnam is not the historical landscape on 
which the fighting and dying took place, but the landscape of public memory. Its 
battlegrounds are monuments, movie screens, and public libraries, presidential campaign 
trails and the Oval Office. At each of these sites, we struggle with one another and 
ourselves to recall the war and to put our recollections to use in the present." 
-Fred Turner 
 
 
The Vietnam War provides Americans today with a rich firmament in which to 
understand their history. This section will identify the different roles that the war plays as 
a resource of historical memory, and develop some problems in how the history of the 
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Vietnam War has trickled down throughout past generations. This project presumes, like 
all projects of history, to bring inaccurate representations of certain aspects of the 
Vietnam War closer to the truth. Additionally, like any historical project, it cannot 
recreate the past perfectly, but can perhaps draw us back to a closer approximation of 
what really happened leading up to, during, and as a result of the Vietnam War. First, I’ll 
provide some general perspective on the ethos surrounding Vietnam veterans as figures 
of historical inquiry. Perhaps no other American war has produced a set of veterans that 
has been studied in such great detail, and this project aims to further this study with both 
validity and clarity.  
David Halberstam, noted journalist who covered many important events of the 
Vietnam war, includes an important quote from a WWII veteran in his novel about the 
Vietnam War, One Very Hot Day: 20 
We didn't know how simple it was, and how good we had it. Sure we walked, but 
in a straight line. Boom, Normandy beaches, and then you set off for Paris and 
Berlin. Just like that … All you needed was a compass and good sense. But here 
you walk in a goddamn circle, and then you go home, and then you go out the 
next day and wade through a circle, and then you go home and the next day you 
go out and reverse the circle you did before, erasing it. Every day the circles get 
bigger and emptier. 
The anfractuous strategic trajectories and foggy criteria for success were perhaps the 
biggest identifying characteristics of the Vietnam War in comparison to other American 
wars. Victory was not measured in the amount of territory taken from the enemy. There 
                                                        
20  Halberstam, One Very Hot Day, 114 
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were no fronts, and the enemy appeared sporadically and absconded discreetly. This 
added even more stress onto the shoulders of the men who served in Vietnam, as a 
firefight victory did not equate to an overall sense that the war was being won.  Tim 
O’Brien, in his novel Going After Cacciato puts this sentiment well. Soldiers21 
did not know even the simple things: a sense of victory, or satisfaction, or 
necessary sacrifice. They did not know the feeling of taking a place and keeping 
it, securing a village and then raising the flag and calling it a victory. No sense of 
order or momentum. No front, no rear, no trenches laid out in neat parallels. No 
Patton rushing for the Rhine … They did not have targets … They did not know 
strategies … They did not know how to feel … they did not know which stories to 
believe … They did not know good from evil. 
Service in Vietnam carried little gratification for its combatants and little else for their 
loved ones and fellow countrymen at home. Clear demarcations of victory were opaque, 
inscrutable, ineffable.  
 Another important characteristic of the Vietnam War was its ratio of US non-
combat to combat troops in country. Ronald H. Spector contends that "[b]y 1968, service, 
support, and headquarters troops made up at least 70-80% of all U.S. military personnel 
in Vietnam."22 While these statistics make clear that most Vietnam veterans did not see 
regular combat, this project focuses on those veterans who did.  
 One last important undercurrent in Vietnam,23 which will be the focus of Section 
IV of this project, was the role played by one’s fellow servicemen. Oftentimes, besides 
                                                        
21 O'Brien, Going After Cacciato, 255-6 
22 Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam, 260 
23 And likely in all wars. 
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the families that were thousands of miles away, your platoon-mates were the only 
connection you had to the way things used to be back in America. John Sack captures this 
sentiment well in his novel M. Early in the book, M Company’s sergeant gives a lecture 
on the role of your buddies in the M: 24  
‘this is our job in Vietnam, we’re here to kill the VC,’ M listening silently, none 
of its faces revealing whether the sergeant’s words had reassured it. ‘Now this 
battalion is good – know why? Why, because we help our buddies. We don’t let 
our buddies down. I want you troops to say, if there’s anywhere in the world that I 
want to get wounded it’s in this battalion! Because my buddies’ll bring me in, 
they’re not going to leave me,’ M not moving an eyelash. 
Though we’ll see this type of instruction and value later in the project, it cannot be 
understated. The survival of the group of men with whom you fought was tantamount to 
your own. Thus, protecting them was one of the highest priorities for the average 
American infantryman in Vietnam.  
Sack also provides an account of M’s ideological motivations for the war. The25  
truth is M didn’t need to know its enemy to abominate him, just as it didn’t need 
to know Thomist philosophy to appreciate God is good. Communism’s 
wickedness seemed to M to be sewn in the primeval warp of the universe, it was 
indelible like the earth’s magnetic field, it was axiomatic… [M] couldn’t have 
quoted two consecutive words of Johnson’s why it was going there: and M didn’t 
need to. M firmly believed – or rather, it firmly believed that it firmly believed – 
in the principle of perpendicular geography, the article of faith that all of this                                                         
24 Sack, M, 82 
25 Sack, M, 109 
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world’s sovereign countries stand on their ends and if one topples over the rest 
shall follow… 
Though this characterization may well have described the viewpoints used by the 
politicians who oversaw American involvement in Vietnam, this project will also argue 
that the political agenda of the war were not a decisive motivational factor for many 
soldiers who served in Vietnam. Such are the stakes of a historical account of Vietnam 
veterans. While this project runs the risk of intruding upon and condensing the 
experiences of others, it is for the purpose of correcting what may be faulty conceptions 
of Vietnam veterans in the American public at large.  
 
 So, what specific role(s) does the Vietnam War as an historical entity play in the 
minds of the American public? As we’ll see, very many, and some are more accurate than 
others. This section is an attempt both to present current problems in the way we think 
about Vietnam veterans, and discuss the circumstances under which flawed conceptions 
of history can generate and perpetuate themselves.  
If anything, the Vietnam War is a symbol of conflict, a time when our country 
was sharply divided between support and dissent. In The Vietnam War in American 
Memory: Veterans, Memorials, and the Politics of Healing, Patrick Hagopian gives the 
example of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, a fund established in the late 1970s, 
arguing that its handling by the American public mirrors the ideological crucible of the 
war itself. He states that:26 
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund attempted to bring together all Americans, 
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whether they had supported or opposed the war, in a common project to honor 
those who had fought and those who had died. But the unity of purpose for which 
they hoped was undermined by the resentments persisting from the war era. 
Politically conservative Vietnam veterans who blamed the U.S. defeat on their 
domestic enemies had too many scores to settle to want to reconcile with their 
antagonists. 
Almost a decade after the last American soldier had left Vietnam, the country was unable 
to agree on a single treatment of its history. Above all else, this should tell us that the 
Vietnam War’s status as a historical symbol is highly controversial.27 What lessons 
should we take from it? As this section discusses, answering this question is extremely 
difficult when addressing such a tender period of our nation’s history. However, many 
misconceptions and inaccuracies can and have precipitated out in our national memory of 
the Vietnam War, largely a result of its symbolic portrayal through various different 
media. This section will discuss the power of historical symbols, and the effects of 
symbolic modes of thought when applied to pursuits of historical knowledge. Then, it 
addresses the specific symbols associated with the Vietnam War, and the epistemological 
problems that these symbols have engendered.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
27 I’ve made a subtle but important transition in nomenclature here between the words “entity” and 
“symbol” when describing the war. This distinction will bear great importance on the rest of this section, as 
these two terms should not be taken as synonymous.  
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i. Historical Symbols & Vietnam Veterans 
 
 
Symbols, for the idle student of history, act as a palliative for the questioning 
mind. A longing for understanding of the past is often soothed by these superficial 
representations of peoples and societies, and for this reason it is understandable how 
symbols perpetuate themselves down through the generations.  
Symbols and symbolic structures of thought play a not dismissible role in the way 
people think about and remember their history. Bertrand Russell, Carl Jung, and other 
such pivotal thinkers of the 20th century have devoted their careers to identifying the 
nature and role of symbolism and symbolic logic. Russell understood the idealization 
process bound up in symbolic logic as “the doctrine that whatever exists, or at any rate 
whatever can be known to exist, must be in some sense mental,”28 as opposed to 
empirical. Russell draws this distinction to illustrate the seductiveness of symbolic logic. 
It allows us to idealize our thought processes into discrete and definitive entities, which 
are then used to deduce the truth on some matter or another. Though symbolic logic can 
be a wonderful tool for deriving valid conclusions in logic and mathematics,29 it presents 
certain problems of inaccuracy when applied to the social sciences. In this sense, 
symbolic logic is a tool that can be used for elucidation or delusion.  
History, especially when it is re-purposed and distributed as a commercial entity 
in popular culture, does not escape the grasp of this mode of thought. Many people get 
their history of the Vietnam War from commercial films like Platoon (Oliver Stone), We                                                         
28 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, 26 
29 Two fields which have the luxury of a reified set of linguistic expressions.  
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Were Soldiers (Mel Gibson), and others that I will examine below. While these can be 
enjoyable, they often include glaring historical inaccuracies and precipitate 
misunderstandings amongst their audiences. Exposure to these kinds of symbolic 
representations of the past cause the casual observer to swoon before his or her presumed 
comprehensive understanding, while often inaccurate cinematic depictions of the past 
hold them in thrall. These cinematic symbols can and often do constrain our perceptual 
experiences of reality, and thus claim an epistemological authority in a way that no 
amount of real world experience ever could. In this sense, they are often harmful to 
historical understanding. I’ll use one especially potent, salient, symbol originating during 
the period of the Vietnam War as a case study for the problems of symbolic logic when 
applied to history.  
At the very beginning of his memoir The Killing Zone, Frederick Downs places an 
epigrammatic anecdote designed to begin the story in a controversial tone. He tersely 
recounts an episode wherein a war protestor spat in his face upon realizing that Downs 
had fought in Vietnam.30 Other vets make similar claims. Such claims have been made at 
other times, but in vastly different circumstances, by different people, for different 
purposes, and to different effects. In trying to smear the domestic anti-war sentiment, 
Richard Nixon once again invoked the image of the “spat-upon veteran” in chiding the 
peace movement as unpatriotic and unsupportive of the young men who were making the 
ultimate sacrifice for country. As journalist Jeffrey Cavanaugh writes, the symbol of the 
spat-upon veteran “originates in … Nixon’s attempts to counter veteran-led opposition to 
                                                        
30 Downs, The Killing Zone, ix 
 30 
the war.”31  
While this symbol may have gained currency at the time of its initial use, some 
voices challenged its legitimacy. Among them, Gary Kulik in his book War Stories: 
False Atrocity Tales, Swift Boaters, and Winter Soldiers - What Really Happened in 
Vietnam, Eric T. Dean in his article “The Myth of the Troubled and Scorned Vietnam 
Veteran,” and Jerry Lembcke in his book The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the 
Legacy of Vietnam all took a closer look at the profile of Vietnam veterans beyond the 
symbols, and found that there were serious causes for concern with this method of 
symbolic representation of the past. As Gary Kulik puts it in his examination of the 
Vietnam War in American media, our standards of knowledge for historical symbols are 
not the same as they are for the rote facts that we use to form everyday beliefs: "Did 
[protestors spitting on veterans] happen? There is no way I can prove it didn't. No one 
can prove a negative. All I can do, and will do, is to underline the implausibility of it all, 
to explain the context in which such stories came to be told, and to undermine those 
stories that are palpably false."32 Such is the aim of this section. By examining the 
relevant evidence for these claims, and by identifying the broader social trends at work in 
this historical period, we can safely assume that the symbol of the spat-upon veteran was, 
in many if not most cases, at least highly dubious, and at most downright fabricated.  
 
Before I address the specific merits and associated problems of the symbol of the 
spat-upon veteran, indeed before I can even get into the positive33 work of this project, I 
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need to articulate the ways in which the American public thinks about Vietnam veterans 
in general. In other words, I need to demonstrate how these men34 have been depicted 
symbolically in the material marketed to the American public as a whole, and also in 
some more scholarly accounts. Additionally, I will include brief treatments of the 
historical problems with these modes of thought, problems which crop up in many 
accounts of historical events when they are made for primarily commercial purposes.  
First Blood (Ted Kotcheff, 1982), starring Sylvester Stallone and initiating what 
would become the increasingly popular and increasingly blood-spattered Rambo series, 
features Stallone as John Rambo, a veteran of the Vietnam War suffering some 
psychological and social after-effects: “And at home at the airport those maggots were 
protesting. They spat at me, called me a baby murderer and shit like that! Why protest 
against me, when they weren't there, didn't experience it? lt was hard, but it's in the 
past.”35 Here again we see the symbol of the spat-upon Vietnam veteran, but this 
particular character also bears some palpable signs of psychological trauma. This 
persona, as Hollywood began to sink its teeth into the war as a subject of cinematic 
commercialism, become something of a stock-character. Characters like Pvt. Joker 
(Matthew Modine, Full Metal Jacket), Travis Bickle (Robert DeNiro, Taxi Driver), Capt. 
Benjamin L. Willard (Martin Sheen, Apocalypse Now), and Michael (Robert DeNiro, The 
Deer Hunter) all embody the psychological duress that Hollywood, and the nation, would 
come to attribute to every Vietnam veteran. As Mark Taylor has argued, the “depiction of 
veterans in The Deer Hunter and other films which achieved critical or commercial                                                         
34 This project focuses mainly on soldiers with combat experience in Vietnam. Though American women 
can currently serve in this capacity in the Army, this was not the case during the period of the Vietnam 
War.  
35 Ted Kotcheff, 1982,First Blood script, http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/r/rambo-script-
transcript-sylvester-stallone.html 
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success provides a useful index of cultural attitudes towards the war, it is notable that the 
temptation to sensationalize the experience of the veteran has persisted."36 The power of 
film served to reify in the minds of many Americans a certain picture of the Vietnam 
veteran. They “made frequent appearances in films and television drama from the late 
1960s onward and, until the later 1970s, they usually meant trouble."37 So, the image of 
Vietnam veterans that has been most broadly propagated among the minds of the 
American public is one of resentment and psychological duress. Is this image accurate? 
How might such an image strengthen the symbol of the spat-upon veteran?  
   
 
ii. Deconstructing the Spat-upon Vietnam Veteran 
 
 
 Whether based in reality or not, superficial representations of social groups can 
be used to drive policies and public opinion to great effect. But what does the evidence 
on just how legitimate the symbol of the spat-upon veteran say? First, there is little 
independently confirmed evidence above hearsay to support that any such spitting ever 
occurred. Second, the broad social trends at work during the time when Vietnam veterans 
were coming home make for a more antagonistic appraisal of the relationship between 
certain veterans and peace movement protestors than might have otherwise been leveled 
in this discussion. These broad social trends, and not the symbols that have precipitated 
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out of them, are the truly valuable material for historians. They are primarily responsible 
for establishing environments in which historical symbols are born. Yet, due to the lustre 
and simplicity of symbolic understandings of history, these broad social trends are often 
ignored and omitted in our nation’s memory. This omission makes it easier for people to 
implant their own, often glaringly inaccurate, causes for historical symbols. It is as 
though history as it happens is a powerful yet temporary storm which leaves a tree 
uprooted. In seeking to understand the tree’s condition, it is much easier to paint one’s 
own picture of history by neglecting the storm’s gale force winds and bolts of lightning. 
What remains in our national memory is not the trends of the time, but the visible 
evidence of what those trends produced. What ought to remain, but often doesn’t, is a 
genuine inquiry into the nature of wind, lightning, and storms in general. I elaborate on 
both of these claims below, and expand the analytical confines of this symbolic 
representation of the past. 
 Before I tackle the specific symbol of the spat-upon veteran, I’ll point out some 
problems inherent in thinking about Vietnam veterans in the broad strokes Hollywood 
images that have been mentioned above. Once I’ve shown this image to be rather 
inaccurate, I’ll address the historical and intellectual shortcomings of the symbol of the 
spat-upon veteran.  
 Patrick Hagopian provides us with a good introduction into understanding 
Vietnam veterans. While “the difficulties the troops faced on their return from Southeast 
Asia to what they called ‘the World’ were not unique,” he does argue that “Vietnam 
veterans as a group faced a particularly difficult homecoming.” Upon what evidence does 
he base this claim, and what motivates this anomalous treatment of returning veterans? 
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While there were likely many reasons that certain people were ill-inclined to give 
Vietnam veterans a heroes welcome back to their home country, Hagopian cites the fact 
that38  
other unpopular wars, such as World War I, had the compensating virtue of 
victory, but Vietnam veterans could not claim its laurels. Instead, they carried the 
stains of defeat and disgrace. Revelations about atrocities against Vietnamese 
civilians tarnished Vietnam veterans’ reputation in the eyes of their compatriots as 
well as undermining the government’s claims about the morality of the U.S. war 
effort in Vietnam. 
Certainly this had something to do with the animosity that existed between returning 
veterans and civilians. But, as Hagopian along with many other military historians well 
know, this is not the whole story. There were many other issues at work besides the 
outcome of the war’s military campaign that affected the way Vietnam veterans and their 
reception by the American public is perceived in history. I discuss these issues below.  
 To be sure, as with most groups of repatriating veterans, there were jarring 
divisions between returning Vietnam veterans and the society they returned to. As 
military historians Richard Severo and Lewis Milford attest in their wonderful account of 
veterans’ experiences after returning from the front, The Wages of War: When America’s 
Soldiers Came Home – From Valley Forge to Vietnam, “for the veterans of Vietnam,” it 
wasn’t just mistreatment by a few people, but39         
 the whole country. In a survey … 37% of the Vietnam veterans in school who 
were questioned said they would rather live in a country other than the United                                                         
38 Hagopian, The Vietnam War in American Memory, 49 
39 Severo and Milford, The Wages of War, 358 
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States. The confrontations [between veterans and civilians] continued, and as they 
unfolded, the divisions between American society and its ex-soldiers as 
exemplified in the Bonus March of 1932 seemed not so remote. 
 In Homeward Bound: American Veterans Return from War Richard H. Taylor 
discusses the malaise that seemed to hang over Vietnam veterans as they attempted to 
reintegrate into civilian society. He cites a poll commissioned by Congress and 
administered by pollster Louis Harris to gauge the nation’s feelings towards its returning 
soldiers. Harris found that “sixty-two percent [of the American public] connected 
veterans directly with a bad war and half considered them dumb for going.”40 As this 
project seeks to demonstrate, this characterization of motives for military service is not 
only unhelpfully reductive, but troublingly unconcerned with the real life experiences of 
the men who served in Vietnam. Nonetheless, a national malaise hung over the returning 
Vietnam veteran, and manifested itself in many ways. However, the specific 
circumstances under which veterans returned home made a significant shift throughout 
the war. As I’ll argue below, the changing factors of the society that received them 
accounted for a considerable portion of their detachment from civilian life when 
compared to the effects of the war itself. This detachment would prove fertile ground in 
which the symbol of the spat-upon veteran spawned.  
 In his article “The Myth of the Troubled and Scorned Vietnam Veteran,” Eric T. 
Dean describes this Vietnam veteran image that had been broadcast to the minds of the 
American public as “either totally ignored by the civilian population, or worse, spat upon 
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and blamed for losing the unpopular war.”41 According to this Hollywood persona, the 
average Vietnam veteran also “suffered from a number of readjustment problems, 
including high unemployment, drug addiction, divorce, suicide … and lingering 
psychological problems.”42 While this might be a tempting characterization for those 
inclined to paint the war as an all-encompassing evil, Dean offers compelling reasons 
why it should not be taken as fact without due consideration of other important details.  
 The parties responsible for popularizing the persona Dean describes, in addition 
to the film directors above, had a vested interest in the American public believing that the 
Vietnam War created destabilized and potentially violent veterans of its soldiers. 
Members of the anti-war movement could more easily fan the flames of social unrest by 
perpetuating an ugly picture of the Vietnam veteran: a psychologically misshapen and 
temperamental product of an unnecessary and evil war. Additionally, as Dean notes, 
“some Vietnam veterans themselves have used the image of the ‘troubled and scorned 
Vietvet’ to obtain a number of benefits from the Federal government.”43 These factors 
motivated misrepresentations of Vietnam veterans in many different forms of media, 
helping to cement a flawed image in the minds of the American public.  
 Dean begins his essay by giving an example of some of the earlier veterans to 
return from the war in 1968 with respect to their re-integration into the national economy 
and job market. Citing an article in the New York Times, he notes that “returning 
servicemen were finding jobs faster than at any time in the past ten years, and some were 
even worried that the Vietnam veterans would not utilize the GI Bill for education since 
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jobs were so easy to find.”44 So, it appears that simply serving in the Vietnam War was 
not a in fact a one-way ticket to unemployment. As Dean points out, as the war dragged 
on, there were other economic forces at work that would prevent returning veterans from 
rapidly finding employment upon their return home. Nixon was elected in 1968 on a 
platform of drawing down the fighting force in Vietnam. Unfortunately for the returning 
veterans of the early 1970s, their journey back to America “coincided with President 
Nixon’s effort to ‘cool down’ the economy.” Thus, they faced increasing domestic 
unemployment “at the exact same time that the greatest number of Vietvets were entering 
the job market.”45 This led to a spike in the unemployment rate of Vietnam veterans, 
which far outstripped that of the national workforce. In reference to some of the examples 
given above of the average Vietnam veteran as he was portrayed in popular media, think 
about Robert DeNiro’s character Travis Bickle from Taxi Driver (Martin Scorsese, 
1976). Having just arrived home from the war, he is caught in the harsh process of 
looking for work in New York City, having to settle on a relatively undesirable job as a 
taxi driver after an arduous job search. Contrary to what this depiction might lead one to 
believe, by 1973, “the returning Vietvets had been reabsorbed into the economy and their 
unemployment rate was essentially the same as that for the general civilian population.”46 
 So, although the returning Vietnam veteran had met sanguine job prospects in 
the late 1960s, a brief period of economic contraction in the early 1970s coupled with an 
inordinate draw-down of troops (which resulted in a correspondingly inordinate increase                                                         
44 Dean, “The Myth of the Troubled and Scorned Vietnam Veteran,” 61  
45 Dean, The Myth of the Troubled and Scorned Vietnam Veteran,” 62 
46 Dean, The Myth of the Troubled and Scorned Vietnam Veteran,” 62. Dean pulls unemployment statistics 
from a New York Times article entitled “Jobless Problem for Ex-GI’s Eases,” which gives their 
unemployment rate as 5.5% compared with the national average of 5.2% - a negligible difference compared 
to where it was just a few years before. 
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of job-seekers in the domestic economy) made for a seductively indelible image of the 
Vietnam veteran as an unhireable cipher in the job market. However, it is clear that his 
service in Vietnam had little if anything to do with this brief predicament. Rather, the 
vicissitudes of the national economy briefly held the unemployment rate of veterans high, 
expanding and accommodating them shortly after this brief period of contraction. But, it 
only took that brief period for this image to gain traction in the minds of the American 
public, and also in the minds of the people who would be portraying veterans in popular 
media for decades to come.  
 Another charge often levied against Vietnam veterans is that their traumatic 
experiences in country drove them to take up recreational drugs in dangerous amounts, 
resulting in debilitating addictions upon their return home. While increased drug-usage 
rates among Vietnam veterans after their tours did exist, it must be qualified by 
identifying different categories of drug abuse. By making such a categorical distinction, a 
more accurate picture of the drug habits of Vietnam veterans becomes clear. According to 
research performed by Nelson and Panzerella, certain veterans’ drug habits became more 
serious after service, while others abated.47 Dividing recreational drug use into six 
distinct categories (marijuana, amphetamines, barbiturates, acid, heroine/morphine, and 
opium) these researchers found that the only proportional increase from before their tours 
of duty to afterwards occurred in the use of heroin/morphine and opiates. Among the 
other four categories of drugs, use actually decreased after tours had been completed 
compared with their pre-tour levels.48 Based on this research, it appears that service in the 
                                                        
47 It should be mentioned that the highest rates of drug use for every category included in the study among 
the respondents was recorded during the war, when the drugs were likely easier to obtain.  
48 Karsten, The Military in America: From the Colonial Era to the Present, 418 
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Vietnam War did not in fact result in debilitating addictions among everyone who 
increased their drug usage while in country. On the contrary, drug use decreased for most 
after the return home. 
 One topic of inquiry about Vietnam veterans, perhaps the most painful to 
discuss, is also perhaps the most under-researched for that reason. As noted above, 
serious mental disturbance and suicidal thoughts are often included in cinematic 
depictions of Vietnam veterans (Travis Bickle, Capt. Benjamin Willard). Suicide, 
according to a June 2007 study published in the Journal of Epidemiology and Community 
Health found that male veterans in general were about twice as likely to commit suicide 
than were males with no military experience.49 Aaron Glantz addresses the paucity of 
available information in his book The War Comes Home: Washington’s Battle Against 
America’s Veterans and points to the VA as a potential bottleneck for such data. His 
frustration is founded in the fact that “over the last thirty years, most observers believe 
more Vietnam veterans have committed suicide than the fifty-seven thousand who died 
fighting the war. No number is definite, however, because over the years the Department 
of Veterans Affairs has stubbornly refused to track the numbers of veterans who commit 
suicide.”50 Glantz does take care to include governmental efforts to prevent suicide 
among returning veterans, such as the “Joshua Omvig Suicide Prevention Act,” (signed 
by President George W. Bush in 2007), which requires across the board psychological 
tests for veterans returning to America, in an effort to diagnose any potential signals of 
oncoming suicide before they metastasize into something more dangerous. So, while 
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suicide may be a serious problem for Vietnam veterans, it remains unclear whether these 
men are more prone to suicide than those who have served in other theatres of American 
military interest. Glantz even speculates that suicide might be a bigger problem for Iraq 
and Afghanistan veterans than it was and continues to be for those who served in 
Vietnam. He cites professor Mark Kaplan (one of the authors of the June 2007 study) 
describing the rarefied set of medical realities faced by American soldiers today. While 
the frontiers of medical research and care have expanded since the days of Vietnam, this 
has some troubling effects on veterans. Kaplan argues that “more and more soldiers are 
surviving this war with severe psychological trauma,” which he attributes to “painful, 
debilitating injuries that people would have died from in previous wars – brain injuries or 
very disfiguring disabilities with third degree burns throughout the body.” In his study, 
“we found that disability was an important risk factor [for suicide] among vets from all 
wars…. The vets that we found that had committed suicide were more likely to have a 
disability.”51 If the VA becomes more willing to share this type of information, 
conclusions might be clearer on the extent to which suicide plagued Vietnam veterans. 
All we can responsibly say now is that, as with many other veterans from many other 
wars, suicide rates among Vietnam veterans lends credence to General Sherman’s creedo: 
“War is hell.” 
  
 But, shedding light on these broadly stated misconceptions about Vietnam 
veterans doesn’t yet get us to the issue of the symbolic power of the spat-upon veteran, 
and how this symbol has come to play an undeserved role in American history. What I                                                         
51 Mark S. Kaplan, Nathalie Huguet, Bentson H. McFarland, and Jason T. Newsom, “Suicide among Male 
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have so far argued is that the Vietnam veteran, based on inaccurate representations in the 
popular media, was often misused and misrepresented as testament to the unequivocally 
evil effects of the war in general. His failings upon attempted re-assimilation to American 
society were touted in films like those mentioned above, as symptomatic of the universal 
bankruptcy of the war and the American military machine. As I’ve shown above, such 
claims need be at least partially recanted. Now, I’ll move on to the specific charge of this 
section: the spat-upon Vietnam veteran. What is it about this symbol that has persisted in 
the historical accounts offered by many veterans of the war? As I’ve hinted at above, its 
historical accuracy is highly questionable, while its relation to the broader trends of the 
American media and the demographic factors at play in the anti-war movement more 
likely account for the use of this symbol as a source of historical authority.  
 In the years after the war’s conclusion, journalist Bob Greene posed a question 
in his Chicago Herald Column to all returning veterans: “Were you spat upon when you 
returned from Vietnam?”52 From the many responses that he received, he wrote a lengthy 
book on Vietnam veterans returning home: Homecoming: When The Soldiers Returned 
from Vietnam. In the initial section entitled, “Yes It Did Happen … It Happened to Me,” 
he includes accounts from numerous veterans all claiming they were spat upon during 
some form of anti-war protest. In the introduction to the subsequent section, entitled “I 
Was Never Spat Upon,” Greene states that some of “the veterans whose stories appear in 
this section do not believe that anyone was spat upon after returning from Vietnam.” 
While these veteran’s responses are rich in detail, Greene doesn’t conduct much rigorous 
sociological analysis of the veterans he is studying, nor of the circumstances to which 
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they returned after their tours of duty. This section will look at other accounts of the 
phenomenon of the “spat-upon veteran,” and also broader issues surrounding their return 
from Vietnam, and propose a general schema under which we can better understand 
Vietnam veterans and their post-tour lives.  
 As Jerry Lembcke writes in The Spitting Image, "in the memory of a large 
number of people the anti-war movement came to be connected with the image of 
activists spitting on veterans. Moreover, what is conversationally safe is not the same as 
good social science. The fact remains that there is scant evidence that any person opposed 
to the Vietnam War engaged in this behavior."53 By scant evidence, he is making a claim 
about the “documentability” of such an incident. If a protestor were to spit on a veteran, 
surely the scandalous nature of the act would have been documented by some news 
source. But, as Lembcke makes clear, there is an acute lack54  
of the kind of direct evidence we would have expected to find in police or court 
records had anti-war people been accused of such an act at the time, when they 
undoubtedly would have been arrested. Certainly today if any political or 
religious group made it a practice of approaching people in public places and 
spitting on them the perpetrators would be arrested. 
Again, it is “impossible to prove a negative,” but this simple fact about the spat-upon 
veteran should give us pause for concern. If there is little in the way of independently 
confirmed evidence of this ever happening, how would such an image gain traction? 
Surely the sensational nature of spitting on men in uniform had to have some 
correspondence with the truth.                                                          
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 As it turns out, this type of question is not far off the mark. According to the 
record, spitting was a practice used by anti-war protestors and in the context of public 
demonstration. However, the targets were not veterans.  
In 1967, author Norman Mailer led a movement against the Pentagon 
encapsulated in his novel The Armies of the Night, wherein he recounts the tale of how 
he, Dwight MacDonald, Robert Lowell, and many others marched on the Pentagon and 
were forcibly restrained by the National Guard. Though Mailer omits any incidence of 
spitting from this account, journalist James Reston, who covered the event, “reported that 
protestors spat upon the National Guardsmen protecting the Pentagon in October 1967.”55 
A year later, at the contentious Democratic Convention in Chicago,  “the Walker Report 
on the police response to the demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in 
Chicago in 1968, documented that demonstrators spit upon National guardsmen as they 
established a perimeter around the Convention Center."56 With these instances of spitting 
at widely covered and highly contentious events, it is easy to see how this symbol was 
propelled into the country’s mainstream discourse surrounding the war as a method 
employed by the anti-war movement against the establishment. Once there, it was much 
easier to apply this symbol to the dichotomy between veterans and anti-war protestors. 
What else about this dichotomy can explain its purported antagonism, and thus the ease 
with which people might apply the symbol of the spat-upon veteran? As I’ll demonstrate 
below, quite a lot.  
But first, what other direct and incontrovertible evidence might there be to prove 
that such a spitting act did in fact happen? Lembcke points out that there isn’t any video                                                         
55 Kulik, War Stories, 27 
56 Ibid.  
 44 
or photographic evidence of this happening. While this might not strike us as a very 
compelling reason to dispute that it ever did happen, he adds the following comment:57 
GIs returned from Vietnam heavily armed with Pentax cameras bought at base 
PXs, so it is likely that such photos would exist - if spitting had occurred with the 
frequency now believed. It is all the more likely that a photo would have been 
snapped if some GIs had actually been told buy the military that they would be 
greeted by hostile "hippies" upon their return. Surely, some enterprising GI, his 
photographic talents honed by a year of picture taking in Vietnam (GI photos 
were processed free, thus inducing many GIs to shoot thousands of slides and 
prints in Vietnam) would have been quite keen to snap a shot of war on the home 
front. 
This strikes me as very disconcerting for the notion of the spat-upon veteran. If it 
did happen in the frequency with which many veterans claim, how could there not be any 
shred of photographic evidence? One would think veterans would have a vested interest 
in punishing these types of protestors, and had the ability to do so. That they did not 
should make us think twice about the legitimacy of this symbol.  
Demographic considerations need also be made in this conversation. I submit that 
the symbolic antagonism between the Vietnam veterans and anti-war protestors inherent 
in the spat-upon veteran historic symbol is based in much more than the peace 
movement’s disapproval of the war and the military’s disapproval of national disloyalty. 
What’s also at stake in this relationship is a clear example of inter-social-class schism and 
resentment and thus, a context of antagonism that might not be clear to the casual thinker. 
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Thinking within this context of antagonism, it is much easier to understand how dubious 
claims about the protest methods used by the anti-war movement might be made by 
veterans. Making this distinction pushes us further in the direction of questioning the 
legitimacy of the spat-upon veteran as a historical symbol. 
 As Michael Useem has demonstrated in his book Conscription, Protest, and 
Social Conflict, a significant portion of the servicemen in Vietnam had less than high 
school diploma and came from lower-income backgrounds. In asking the question: “Have 
you or any immediate relatives been in the armed services and stationed in Vietnam over 
the previous five or six years?”58 Useem tracked the rate of responses from different 
education and income ranks, and cross-referenced these responses with the proportion of 
respondents who themselves served or had relatives who served in Vietnam. His findings 
showed a clear trend between education/family income, membership in the armed forces, 
and service in Vietnam. As education rates (from “10th grade” to “at least some college”) 
and family income of the respondents went up, and membership in the armed forces was 
distributed in a roughly normal “hump” over the education/income categories that Useem 
had defined. However, the proportion of respondents who either themselves had or had 
immediate family members who had served in Vietnam was not distributed in the 
relatively normal “hump” as was service in the armed forces in general. Rather, it was 
highest amongst the lowest levels of education and family income, and gradually came 
down as rates of education and family income went up. So, the Vietnam War seems to be 
at least partially overrepresented in its in-country servicemen by the less educated, poorer 
members of the population.  
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On the other hand, consider the demographic makeup of the anti-war protest 
movement. Surely, some of the biggest hubs of anti-war sentiment were college 
campuses around the nation. Howard Zinn describes the role of students in the peace 
movement as such:59 
The climax of protest came in the spring of 1970 when President Nixon ordered 
the invasion of Cambodia. At Kent State University in Ohio, on May 4, when 
students gathered to demonstrate against the war, National Guardsmen fired into 
the crowd. Four students were killed. One was paralyzed for life. Students at four 
hundred colleges and universities went on strike in protest. It was the largest 
general student strike in the history of the United States. During the school year of 
1969-1970, the FBI listed 1,785 student demonstrations, including the occupation 
of 313 buildings. 
But Zinn is no idle historian. He goes on to offer more context for understanding the anti-
war movement in general, and gives cause for a reconsideration of the movement as 
primarily driven by college students. While he admits that the “publicity given to the 
student protests created the impression that the opposition to the war came mostly from 
middle-class intellectuals,”60 he includes the results of a University of Michigan survey 
showing that “throughout the Vietnam war, Americans with only a grade school 
education were much more strongly for withdrawal from the war than Americans with a 
college education.”61 Zinn’s observation about the prevalent media coverage of “middle-                                                        
59 Zinn, A People’s History of the United States, 361  
60 Ibid.  
61 Zinn, A People’s History of the United States, 362. The specific statistics that Zinn cites are as follows: 
27% of people with a college education were for immediate withdrawal of troops from Vietnam in June of 
1966, with 41% of people holding only a grade school level of education responding in favor of immediate 
withdrawal at that time. By 1970, 47% of the former and 61% of the latter favored immediate withdrawal.  
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class intellectuals” protesting the war plays nicely into the symbolic narrative of the spat-
upon veteran. Such disproportionate coverage of the sources of anti-war opinions likely 
fed the idea among servicemen that all anti-war protesters were college students and thus 
had reaped the benefits of their family’s social class and higher incomes in obtaining 
student deferments from the draft.  
 While there is some truth to this perception among servicemen, it should be 
mentioned here that the demographics of college students were undergoing rapid changes 
in the period of the Vietnam War. No longer was education available primarily to the 
elite, functioning more as a marker of social distinction than a place of intellectual 
development. Doubling from 2 to 4 million in the 1950s, university enrollment ballooned 
to 7 million by 1968.62 This expansion was made possible in large part by federal tuition 
programs designed to increase the average level of education nationwide. Policymakers 
like Clark Kerr and Harlan Hatcher “argued in the 1950s and early 1960s [that the] 
demands placed upon the nation by the emerging American-centered global economy, as 
well as by an escalating nuclear arms race, required the creation of a technologically 
proficient, college-educated, society.”63 Among the expanding ranks of the nation’s 
colleges emerged a new identity, a “new social class … which was neither blue nor white 
collar, and which stood apart from the larger society.”64 So, although the student protests 
were fuelled by recipients of student deferments from the draft, these students themselves 
would likely have claimed a vastly different identity than their counterparts of the 1940s 
and before.  
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 In any event, these two demographic trends may well have struck multiple chords 
of anger and resentment among servicemen returning home after their tours. As much as 
there is an apparent ideological rift between these two groups (one anti-war, one pro or at 
least neutral), the apparent class differences must also be taken into account, as they 
surely played a significant role in galvanizing the anger and alienation that many veterans 
felt towards the anti-war movement. This kind of resentment makes the breeding of 
inaccurate symbols like the spat-upon veteran all the more likely.  
 
 
 This exercise brings us to two conclusions, one merely formal, the other leading 
us into the next section of the project. First, it is very easy to slide into a symbolic logic 
of thinking about the past, arriving at reductive and inaccurate conclusions which glide 
over the precious niceties of history. Without due attention, students of history may well 
leave their studies less rather than more enlightened, and be thus worse off for the effort 
writ large. Second, and more importantly, the imputation of a pro-war attitude by the 
anti-war protestors to returning veterans is bound, as this example shows, to result in 
intractable feelings of resentment, and also gross inaccuracies. In general, this project is 
an attempt to correct these inaccuracies, and diagnose the social dynamics at work among 
the men who actually did the fighting and dying in Vietnam. Once such a diagnosis is 
made, we can perhaps approach a more comprehensive, less reductive, and ultimately 
more accurate understanding of the actions of Vietnam veterans. The first step in this 
process is identifying and deconstructing the symbolic understandings of our past.  
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III: WHEN THEY WERE KIDS: JOHN WAYNE AND THE MEN WHO 
FOLLOWED HIM INTO WAR 
 
 
 
 
“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear 
any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival 
and the success of liberty.” 
-President John F. Kennedy, 1960 Inaugural Address 
 
“There’s some things a man just can’t run away from.” 
-John Wayne as The Ringo Kid 
 
 
 
In reading about the cultural influences that made young American boys more 
inclined to fight in the Vietnam War, it is very surprising to see how much influence one 
particular person wielded. Though JFK, and the lofty global ideals expressed in his 1960 
Inaugural Address, would certainly be high up on this list, he doesn’t come close to the 
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power of film actor Marion Robert Morrison, better known by his stage name John 
Wayne. Wayne was tough, manly, and played by his own rules. He was unafraid to use 
violence when the circumstance called for it, but still adherent to a moral code. Most of 
all, he was a frontiersman, and dealt with the great unknown of the Wild West and its 
dangerous and savage Indian inhabitants. As the above quote hints at, his film persona 
defined the rules of American masculinity. Charting this new territory for the American 
homestead, John Wayne will always be associated in our national memory with the 
expansion of American territory, and more importantly that of American ideology.  
This pattern of American hegemony over indigenous and purportedly inferior 
peoples occurs in stark detail in the context of the Vietnam War. As I’ll discuss in this 
section, the films of John Wayne would play a very important role in many young men’s 
decisions to serve. However, it is important to look to other cultural influences as well in 
the formulation of the motivational schema that will endure throughout this project. 
There were many reasons that young men decided to enlist (and to serve if drafted) and 
fight in the Vietnam War, not all of which can be explained by their desires to live out the 
epic tales of John Wayne they had seen depicted on the screen. This section will attempt 
to break down all of these reasons one by one, and describe how these different reasons 
primed young men in different ways for military service. Though there were certain 
demographic trends observable among the men who did serve (as we have partially seen 
in Section II), these young men entered with different stories and different expectations. 
So, this section looks at a cross-section of Vietnam veterans before they went to war. 
Among the questions it seeks to answer are: What kind of communities did these men 
grow up in? What shaped their worldviews? Who were their role models? What, if 
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anything, did they think about military service, or about the war in Vietnam before they 
enlisted or were drafted? As with each section, I’ll pull the evidence upon which my 
answers to these questions are based from two qualitatively different sources: memoirs 
and the data collected from surveys as described in the “Methodology” portion of Section 
I. This section largely serves to identify motivations for military service that did not enter 
the minds of servicemen as a condition of the experience of service itself. In other words, 
these are the pure motivations; they do not spring up after the decision to serve has been 
made.  
 
 
i. Political Rhetoric 
 
 
Before it became a reality for the men who served, Vietnam was closer to a 
vague, rhetorical notion, if not a completely alien and unknown entity. Illuminated by 
speeches from politicians like Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson 
and Democratic Senate Majority Whip Russel Long, Vietnam represented a crossroads of 
geopolitical ideology. One the one side were the grasping communists, bent on world 
domination and imposition of global communism. On the other was America, 
courageously taking up the battle for freedom, and protecting those countries too weak to 
protect themselves. This theatrical dichotomy is necessarily reductive, but it can 
nonetheless be observed in the rhetoric of many prominent politicians in talking about 
war in Vietnam.  
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In 1966, Congressman Long addressed the issue of Vietnam and America’s 
obligation to it in saying that America:65 
was founded because we had courageous men. We became a great nation because 
the people had courage. They did not give up because they had to fight Indians. If 
the men who came on the Mayflower were frightened to helplessness the first 
time they had to fight Indians, they would have gone back to England on the 
Mayflower. But they fought the Indians and won, meanwhile losing some fine 
Americans, until this Nation became great. We are upholding [in Vietnam] our 
commitments in the proud tradition of our fathers, grandfathers, great-
grandfathers, and many other courageous Americans who fell on the field of 
battle. 
An antipodal country that had never had much to do with American life like 
Vietnam was necessarily an unfamiliar concept in the minds of most Americans. By 
couching this country in the rhetorical structures that had run through American history 
since its founding, Congressman Long here attempts to elicit more concern with the 
welfare of Vietnam and its people among the American public. He draws upon the 
tradition of American history and argues this tradition requires involvement in Vietnam. 
Though his history of American westward expansion leaves out its aggressive and 
rapacious nature, it still works as a rhetorical device attached to Vietnam. Congressman 
Long was now equating in the minds of many young Americans the duty of American 
history and service in the Vietnam War.  
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 President Lyndon Baines Johnson also contributed to Vietnam’s rhetorical status. 
A shrewd user of the Domino Theory, he sought to define Vietnam as another domino 
waiting to topple, contributing to an eventual American capitulation to communism if 
nothing was done. “If we quit Vietnam tomorrow we’ll be fighting in Hawaii and next 
week we’ll have to be fighting in San Francisco.”66 
 Robert Mason, a helicopter pilot in Vietnam, provides an example of the public 
effect of this speech in his memoir Chickenhawk. His initial desire to serve was a 
combination of his youthful desire for flight, and also a televised speech of President 
Lyndon Johnson’s. When Mason, “heard President Johnson announce on television, ‘We 
will stand in Vietnam,’ and ‘I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division.’ A 
tinge of fear mixed with excitement came over me. The games were over. Life was 
getting very serious for helicopter pilots."67 Mason was clearly influenced by the 
speeches he heard on TV, but he is not without his hesitations concerning the war effort 
in Vietnam. As he states, he68  
wasn't a believer. Now that I was interested enough to read about it, I thought the 
Vietnamese ought to be able to decide what kind of government they wanted, just 
like we had. If they wanted to be Communists, then they ought to be. They 
probably wouldn't like Communism; but, then everybody has to make his own 
mistakes. If democratic capitalism was better for them, then they'd fight for it.  
Mason exhibits a probity about the moral equation of the war that few of his 
fellow servicemen likely shared. However, this worry about the legitimacy of the war 
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was ”spawned by my fear of dying young.”69 This fear notwithstanding, LBJ’s 
exhortations played perhaps a decisive role in Mason’s desire to serve in Vietnam.  
 Scott Higgins shared Mason’s hesitation about the righteousness of the war. 
Nevertheless, he decided to serve based on the feelings of national loyalty likely imbued 
in him by the political rhetoric to which he has been exposed. He “went over there 
against the war because I thought it was a mistake, but that still didn't excuse me. If I was 
called I was going to go. I suppose it comes from a certain kind of patriotism many 
people had back then."70 In the context of the political ideologies being touted by 
President Johnson and Congressman Long, Higgins reaction is entirely understandable. It 
binds him into a fellowship with other Americans, and insures him against accusations of 
laziness or disloyalty.  
 Another infantryman, Leroy TeCube, was likely influenced by the ideas 
propounded from the political institutions of the country. As he was being processed in 
January of 1968, he ran into one of his buddies from basic training in Ft. Polk, a Mr. 
Leon-Guererro, who would not return from his tour of duty. This prompted TeCube to 
make the following remark: "The brief encounter with him and his parents will always 
hold a special place in my heart. It reminds me of how much we were willing to sacrifice 
to help another country. That was the reason we headed to an unknown country halfway 
around the world."71 In the case of TeCube, we will see (in Section IV) how his 
motivations to fight undergo a stark change once he arrives in country and begins to 
perform his duties as an infantryman. However, it is important to note here the main 
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reasons that TeCube has for consenting to military service. Much like Howard Zinn, he 
believes his service to be a helping hand for the people of South Vietnam.  
 The last politician I include in this section is President John F. Kennedy. In 1960, 
he delivered one of the most memorable inaugural addresses in American history. As 
quoted above, JFK undertook a similar task in his address to that of Congressman Long 
and LBJ. As he was free to flex his red-baiting muscle on the campaign trail (more so 
than was his opponent Richard Nixon), this rhetorical flourish espoused defending 
freedom from communism around the globe at any cost. His soaring rhetoric found deep 
purchase in the hearts of many young men around the country, and many mention him as 
a motivating figure in their service in Vietnam. Philip Caputo, a former Marine and 
author of A Rumor of War, states early on that part of his reason for joining the Marines 
in 1960 was that he “got swept up in the patriotic tide of the Kennedy era.”72 Frank 
McCarthy, a rifleman included in Al Santoli’s To Bear Any Burden (a title lifted exactly 
from JFK’s inaugural) mentions Kennedy’s rhetoric as being bound up with his identity 
and pride: “We were Kennedy’s soldiers and proud of it. It was an honor and a privilege 
to be a soldier under JFK.”73 Sgt. Allen E. Paul was also clearly affected by the 
President’s speech and ideology, writing in a letter to his sweetheart Beverly that he 
“keep[s] saying one of JFK's sayings over and over - it goes something like this: ‘The 
credit belongs to the man, the man who actually is in the arena, his face covered with 
sweat and mud.’”74 Though he misattributes this Teddy Roosevelt quote to JFK, 
Kennedy’s symbolic power is still evident here with Paul.  
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 The content of political speeches, while sometimes exhilarating and awe-
inspiring, is still only a small piece of this initial motivational schema. I mention it first 
because it probably has the greatest claim to universality among the men who served. The 
ideals expressed by these politicians bound the nation together, and forged a common 
identity and mutual relationships among its men and women. As we will see, other 
sources emitted this ideology of rolling back communism. Moreover, defending liberty 
and stamping out communism played only a minor if any role in many young men’s 
decisions to serve.  
 
 
ii. Cultural Media 
 
 
Ronald Lawrence Kovic was, as his memoir Born on the Fourth of July implies, 
indeed born on the 4th of July in 1946. Born in Wisconsin but raised in Massapequa, New 
York, Kovic had what he recounts as an idyllic childhood. Growing up, he quickly 
became infatuated with such heroes as Micky Mantle and John Wayne, and also quickly 
learned to associate these monolithic, larger-than-life heroes with his own country’s 
identity. Playing mock war games with his friends in the surrounding woods of his 
neighborhood, Kovic waxes on about how “we’d walk out of the woods like the heroes 
we knew we would become when we were men.”75 His childhood pursuits are governed 
to a substantial degree by these heroic figures that were presented to him as synonymous 
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with national identity. He feels personally related to them through his own nascent 
patriotism.  
Of the many causes of Kovic’s eventual service in Vietnam, one sticks out as 
especially interesting for this subsection. As a high school student and an American kid 
growing up in the 1950s, he was exposed to certain cultural representations of his country 
and its enemies abroad that would shape his worldview. Being born on the fourth of July 
imbued young Ronald with a preternatural love for his country, and an inclination to ally 
himself with whatever he was told represented American interests. This national pride 
eventually develops a military orientation. Again, as many youngsters growing up in the 
post-WWII years, Kovic is exposed to certain media idolizing America’s role in that 
conflict. His is the side of good and moral righteousness (The Allied Forces), contrasted 
with that of absolute evil and baseness (The Axis Forces). Seeing Sputnik orbit above 
him in the sky galvanizes this ardency; Kovic felt compelled to defend the country that he 
loved so dearly against the alien and potentially hostile. Immediately after witnessing this 
celestial demonstration of Russian technological strength, he takes up an interest in the 
inner mechanisms of rockets, in a juvenile effort to aid what he perceives to be his 
country’s lagging space program. At this point, Kovic has proven himself as a young 
impressionable boy who is given completely to whatever he believes his country’s cause 
to be.  
Kovic’s conception of ‘otherness’ embodied in the USSR gains more concrete 
form when he sees television shows like I Led Three Lives. Its portrayal of the insidious 
effects of communism on American life strengthens Kovic’s distaste for the external 
forces deemed to be hostile to his country’s interests. He begins to align himself with the 
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kind of thinking popularized by George Kennan and his famous “Long Telegram” and 
coming to fruition in the Truman Doctrine, seeing communism as a creeping force hostile 
to American interests with the potential to insidiously circumscribe the globe. He will 
eventually include the Viet Cong in this same category. Absorbing instructional videos 
(as we’ll see shortly) decrying the evils of communism were par for the course for many 
servicemen during the Vietnam War. That Kovic receives these messages as part of his 
pre-military life plays a huge role in his eventual decision to join the Marines.  
Similar stories abound, and are likely influenced by other such cinematic 
representations of the evils of Communism in films like The Red Menace (1949), I 
Married a Communist (1949), and Invasion U.S.A (1952). Additionally, WWII films, 
upon which this generation of American men had been raised, also played an important 
role in shaping perceptions of war and national duty. By76  
portraying combat in WWII in terms of a global struggle against a clearly 
identifiable evil which could only be subdued by superior force … WWII combat 
films became an important socializing influence, giving symbolic form to a 
number of ideas which thereupon achieved the status of everyday knowledge. 
This sentiment relates back to the symbolic modes of knowledge discussed in Section II, 
but addresses how the men who would eventually fight in Vietnam were first exposed to 
the idea of war, rather than how the war itself is remembered.77  
Apart from commercial films, military educational films also played a 
considerable role. As related by Gerald Snead in The Vietnam War, A Brother’s Account, 
                                                        
76 Lewis, The Tainted War: Culture and Identity in Vietnam War Narratives, 22 
77 As we will see, many Vietnam veterans had an even better source of WWII history in their lives: their 
fathers and uncles. 
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the films shown at basic training dealt with the same subject matter, but with less 
subtlety:78 
You watch the commercial and the element of truth is the product they’re trying 
to sell; it does exist. They then surround the product with ridiculous words, catch 
phrases, and actions that usually have nothing to do with the quality of the 
product… after seeing it time and time again, we begin to remember the product 
by the commercial. The two exist as one, so upon entering a store, we are more 
likely to pick up something familiar, not realizing that the familiarity was brought 
about by the commercial. 
As Thomas Palmer points out, these indoctrination activities “have taken place in 
America’s armed forces since 1941.”79 Their main function today is to address “such 
nonmilitary subjects as citizenship, democracy vs. communism, forces for freedom, and 
world affairs.”80 Though Snead exhibits some resistance to the message of the film, he is 
nonetheless drawn into its way of representing the war and his role in it.  
There is an obvious parallel here with the cinematic symbols discussed in Section 
II. Both evoke Umberto Eco’s conception of the perceptual dissonance between 
linguistics and semiotics. When portrayed via the media of “photographic, motion-
picture, and television images [as opposed to spoken or written language],” a particular 
version of personal duty and national service gets imprinted into the visual constituents of 
these films. However, the experience of watching these films does not function as a 
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“sequence of discrete elements,” but as a “toposensitive whole,” 81 designed to reshape of 
enforce a certain code of thought and behavior. The danger, as Eco tells us, lies in our 
tendency to view imprints not as disconnected and artificial images, but as mirror 
images:82 
At a certain level of analysis – when, for instance, one is concerned only with 
iconographic conventions – one is entitled to look at photographic imprints as if 
they were real mirror images, that is, the immediate result of a reflection tout 
court [sic], and their semiotic strategies will be investigated only at the highest 
manipulatory levels (staging, framing, and so on). In other cases, it would be, on 
the contrary, indispensable to cast in doubt their presumed ‘innocence’, [sic] to 
discuss their cultural origin, the non-naturality of their supposed causal relation 
with the referent. 
Decocting the rarefied semiotician-ese, Eco’s point is simply that photographs, movies, 
and television present seductive versions of reality that tend to trick our perceptive 
capacities into endorsing their status as mirror images of the world around us, as we 
would our own reflection when we look in a mirror. We embrace these images as 
representing the truth, because we are conditioned to do so by simply opening our eyes 
every morning when we wake up.  
The responses of Snead and Kovic to this type of political propaganda 
demonstrate its efficacy. Both soldiers come from very different backgrounds, and have 
very different conceptions of the primacy of national duty. Still, neither is completely 
immune from the intellectual hegemony of the propaganda to which they are exposed.                                                         
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This comparison paints a clear picture of the role and potency of anti-communist 
propaganda as it influenced those who fought in the Vietnam War.  
No discussion of anti-communist propaganda would be complete without 
reference to a film starring John Wayne. A hardcore conservative and anti-communist 
himself, he starred in the 1968 film The Green Berets, which premiered just a few months 
after the Tet Offensive. As John Mueller has demonstrated, public support for the war 
effort had been declining steadily since 1965 (with a roughly corresponding increase in 
public opposition, those people holding no opinion remaining relatively unchanged).83 In 
addition to its primarily commercial motivations, the release of this film might be 
interpreted as an attempt to inject new life into public support for the war (while also 
paying tribute to the military expertise of some of America’s most specialized forces in 
country: the Green Berets).84 The Green Berets’ representation of the war included85   
details [that] evoke[d] the atmosphere of the western and enable[d] contemporary 
audiences to put recent events in Vietnam to the back of their minds (Tet 
Offensive) … [the film] also reminded Americans that they were the winners and 
reinforced an important aspect of the Special Forces' heritage: 'the tough, self-
reliant, combat-tested solder who fought on the Indian frontier of our own country 
during the 1870s.' 
Such a film attempted to shoot life back into the American war effort, but its intended 
effects were never realized.                                                          
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 Though this film did not rally the domestic front to support the war to the 
intended degree, its significance as a type of propaganda should not be overlooked. 
Wayne, as he had been doing in the other Western films in which he starred (Stagecoach, 
The Searchers, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, True Grit, etc.) brings together 
Congressman Long’s espousal of American territorial expansion and the Vietnam War. 
Using his semi-mythological status as exemplar of American tradition, he portrayed the 
American soldier as fighting boldly against evil communist forces in Vietnam. This 
dynamic mirrored his films set in the U.S., wherein he fought against the evil Indian 
forces bent on destroying white civilization in the Wild West. As Turner describes in 
Echoes of Combat: The Vietnam War in American Memory, the nation had a distinct and 
potent fascination and voyeurism with John Wayne:86  
In the early 1960s, John Wayne served as an intermediary between private lives 
and national myths. Through him, individual citizens gained access to the 
immense emotional treasure-house of American right and might. In backyards and 
back alleys, Wayne’s ‘willingness to use violence’ impelled prepubescent boys to 
play cowboys and Indians and to attach each other with chrome-plated mock 
revolvers…. Having seen that justice flowed in John Wayne’s wake in the 
movies, many Americans assumed that justice must likewise naturally flow in the 
wake of American interventions abroad…. As they watched John Wayne, 
Americans – particularly young male Americans – could feel that power in 
themselves. 
It was films like those that made John Wayne famous and also wrought important 
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changes on the mindsets of the young boys who would soon be sent to fight in Vietnam. 
Lloyd B. Lewis puts it nicely in saying that these films87 
encouraged the audience to dissociate and depersonalize experience, to view life 
as a movie [sic]. This tendency to detach oneself from the ongoing flow of events 
in the perceptual field is a behavioral trait which movie-going made possible. The 
Vietnam War was, at least for some of the soldiers who fought it, The Vietnam 
War Movie [sic]… 
The star power wielded by actors like John Wayne, while insufficient to pull the nation 
out of the shock surrounding the Tet Offensive, was nonetheless an important factor in 
shaping the thoughts and decisions of the generation of young men, like Ron Kovic, who 
would serve their country in Vietnam.  
 
 
iii. What/Who Are We Fighting For? 
 
 
The ardent patriotism that Ron Kovic had nurtured as a youth is lacking one 
ingredient before it can be turned into a viable fighting force for the military: 
testosterone. As he matures into adolescence, his body, and with it his general spirit of 
holistic well-being, also changes. He takes up wrestling in high school, for which he 
develops a muscled physique. Kovic takes pride in his natural developments, his 
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“wrestlers shoulders,”88 and other physical changes in his body. His body is now 
becoming as much of a precious possession for him as his citizenry and identification 
with American nationalism. These physical changes in young Ron Kovic’s body should 
not be under-stressed. It is his own confidence in his own physical capabilities that 
partially assures him of his potential success as a soldier. This borderline vanity will play 
an integral role in his eventual disillusionment with the American military, but its role 
before his service is primarily to stoke his confidence and feed his desire to put himself to 
the test. To truly validate his new physique, warfare provided a great test for young men 
like Kovic.  
As he matures physically, Kovic’s patriotic yearnings strengthen in potency and 
rigidity. The night before he is to be shipped off to basic training he89  
stayed up most of the night … watching the late movie. Then ‘The Star-Spangled 
Banner’ played. I remember standing up and feeling very patriotic, chills running 
up and down my spine. I put my hand over my heart and stood at rigid attention 
until the screen went blank. 
Kovic is truly his country’s son. His allegiance to national interest borders on 
jingoism at this point; he lives and dies with America. This newfound potency also 
breeds an acute nausea in Kovic about the prospect of remaining in Massapequa for the 
rest of his life, following in his father’s footsteps. His school friends, not his parents, now 
have a more influential role over his behavior. As they had consorted about the 
wilderness playing war against each other, Kovic now wants to put his newfound 
confidence to the test.                                                         
88 Kovic, Born on the Fourth of July, 64 
89 Kovic, Born on the Fourth of July, 75 
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 There is a strand of Lewis B. Puller’s story similar to this one. In speaking about 
his college years, and in reflecting in particular on the summer of 1967, he admits how he 
“had drifted through the previous four years, drinking beer and chasing girls with a 
singleness of purpose that belied my lack of meaningful direction, and now, on the 
threshold of manhood and with the war as a backdrop, I realized that the time had come 
to put frivolity aside.”90 By “putting frivolity aside,” Puller refers to continuing the 
illustrious military tradition established by his father and passed down to him through his 
family. I’ll discuss these kinds of influences below, but here the point is that Puller is 
partially motivated by feelings of ennui with the life he is currently leading at home, as 
though it doesn’t measure up with the life he had envisioned for himself. He feels as 
though there is something lacking from his life, something that military service might 
satisfy.  
 Norman Russell, in Suicide Charlie, remembers a platoon-mate dubbed “Bean.” 
He had come from a rural community in Minnesota, hard in its Mennonite underpinnings 
and conservative ideologies. He was bored, with no proms, no dances, and nothing to do 
around the town. As Russell recounts, 91 
[t]he Army was one way [out], and Bean didn't even wait till his number came up 
to take it. He had partied through a single quarter in junior college sixty miles 
down the road in Worthington, then dropped out and volunteered for the draft so 
he could go off to basic at Fort Lewis with some buddies. He knew from watching 
Walter Cronkite every night that maybe five hundred guys a week were coming 
back in tin boxes, but it never sank in that one of them might be him.                                                         
90 Puller, Fortunate Son: The Healing of a Vietnam Veteran, 30 
91 Russell, Suicide Charlie, 37 
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It appears that the ennui that “Bean” felt as a result of his upbringing and community was 
enough to de-emphasize the palpable risks to life and limb involved in warfare.  
James Hebron was seduced by military service as it seemed to provide an 
opportunity to indulge the more libidinous parts of his desires. He confesses an early 
demystification in his military career: 92 
I joined the Marines when I was seventeen, having graduated from high school a 
year early. At that age I was super-naive. I was influenced by combat as written 
by noncombatants, i.e., Stephen Crane, author of the Red Badge of Courage. A 
combination of that plus bravado, you know: Marine Corps, blood, rape, kill, 
plunder, that kind of thing. It was just fantasy until I got orders for Vietnam. 
Hebron has been influenced both by portrayals of war in literature, and by his the onset of 
adolescence. 
 John Ketwig, in his memoir … and a Hard Rain Fell, offers a good account of the 
distinction between, or rather what GIs saw as the distinction between Vietnam and "The 
World.” The93 
[w]orld wasn't a planet. It was your hometown, your tree-lined street in the 
suburbs, your tenement in the ghetto. It was your wife, or girl fire, or mom, or just 
a female with round eyes and a swelling bosom…. The World was flush toilets 
and doorknobs and fishing streams. A mythical, magical place that had existed 
once, and would again, and had been interrupted by the Vietnam war as a TV 
show is interrupted by a commercial. 
  Growing up on a farm near the Finger Lakes, Ketwig developed an early love of                                                         
92 Santoli, Everything We Had, 88 
93 Ketwig, …and a Hard Rain Fell, 4 
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rock and roll drumming and of cars and car repair. When he speaks about his parents, and 
about the parents of the kids coming of age in the '60s in general, Ketwig takes a 
skeptical tack:94  
They told you to defend freedom, and used cattle prods on the Freedom Riders in 
Alabama…. This is a democracy. It didn't always work just right, they said, but 
your generation will have to get it all together because now there's a bomb that 
can eliminate the whole population of the planet. So we grew up believing we 
could do it, and that the answer was peace, or love, or the golden rule, or whatever 
you wanted to call it. 
His decision to go to war is thus not as automatic as that of an enlistee like Ron Kovic.  
In the time leading up to his service, many community members pushed Ketwig to enlist, 
claiming that his orders would probably not be as dangerous as an enlistee than as a 
draftee. Among many memoirs, this kind of calculus attached itself to the decision to 
enlist or wait for one’s draft number to be called. The received wisdom held that enlisting 
decreased one’s chances of being assigned an MOS with regular combat. Sociologist 
Charles Moskos has performed a study to verify this claim. In The American Enlisted 
Man, Moskos demonstrates that draftees in Vietnam were slightly more likely than 
volunteers to serve in combat positions, but not by much.9596  
At this point, it is clear that Ketwig doesn't agree with the war on an ideological 
basis; he doesn't want to kill VC because it violates the "golden rule," the rule that he 
believes his generation was taught to live by, but was also taught to ignore when it came                                                         
94 Ketwig, … and a Hard Rain Fell, 10 
95 Karsten, Military in America, 414 
96 28% of the men drafted and 23% of those undrafted (either volunteers or “draft-motivated” volunteers) 
made up the combat forces in Vietnam.  
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to communism and its potential influence in the world and in America. He doesn't really 
know much about the country of Vietnam, along with likely the vast majority of the men 
who fought there.  
 
 
iv. Family Values 
 
 
 In his memoir Fortunate Son: The Healing of a Vietnam Vet, Lewis B. Puller 
describes the structural influences at work as he considered service in Vietnam. He would 
eventually become a 2nd lieutenant and go to Vietnam in the summer of 1968, leaving 
shortly thereafter as a result of serious debilitating injuries suffered in the field. Among 
his reasons for being willing to serve, Puller emphasizes his family’s military tradition. 
Puller’s father epitomized this tradition for his son:97 
There were other things I noticed about my father in the summer and fall of 1951, 
a time during which he made a special effort to be accessible to his only son and 
to make up for his absence during the war. My father was born before the turn of 
the century, the third of four children and the elder son. His father was a traveling 
salesman whose battle with cancer had been lost by the time Father was ten. His 
grandfather had been killed by Union fire at Kelly’s Ford in Virginia during the 
Civil War, and his boyhood heroes, long before he became a role model for a 
newer generation of Americans, had been Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson. 
                                                        
97 Puller, Fortunate Son: The healing of a Vietnam Vet, 3-4 
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When Father came home from his fifth and last war, Lee and Jackson remained in 
his eyes the standard against which all military leaders were measured, and I 
remember kneeling with him and invoking their hallowed names in my bedtime 
prayers before he tucked me in. 
The military men of the past become larger than life figures for Puller and his father, role 
models upon which they base their own behavior.  
Puller goes on to mention how his father’s debilitating physical and mental 
condition98 pushed him towards military service, towards carrying on the family tradition 
all the more. He remembers how, as he grew older, he “began the sometimes painful 
process by which a son distances himself from his father in preparation for striking out on 
his own,” and “began to realize that [his] father the man and [his] father the legend were 
not always one and the same.”99 In this light, Puller wants to serve not only to carry on a 
hallowed family tradition, but also perhaps to reclaim the social respect accorded to his 
family as a result of the tradition that his father and grandfather before him had 
embodied.  
Defending one’s family’s social status and respectability also played a role in 
Allen Paul’s decision to volunteer for enlistment. Paul served with the men of A Battery, 
1st of the 77th Artillery, and D and E companies, 2nd of the 5th Cavalry. In his collection of 
letters sent to his parents and his girlfriend during his service, Paul initially claims a 
desire to provide for his family’s good name in their community by means of his service. 
In this sense, he exhibits a robust sense of patriotism and national duty during his time in 
OCS training, saying that he “wants the world to know that the Paul family did what was                                                         
98 In part a result of his old age and many years of rigorous military service.  
99 Puller, Fortunate Son: The Healing of a Vietnam Vet, 27 
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asked of them in Vietnam.”100 He fears being lumped in with the opposition movement to 
the war, which is, admittedly, modest in size at this time. Still, he can’t comprehend how 
these people can be so disloyal to their country.  
Another veteran who lists family influences as motivating his service is Philip 
Caputo, author of the memoir A Rumor of War. Caputo was among one of the first whose 
battalions landed in Vietnam, landing with the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Da 
Nang in 1965.101 Interestingly, he does not come from as strong of a military tradition as 
does Puller, and correspondingly his father didn’t play as big a role in his service. While 
he does include a “being swept up in the patriotic tide of the Kennedy era” as a reason for 
his service, it is not the largest. Rather, he lists his biggest reason for wanting to serve in 
the military as the boredom he felt with “the safe, suburban existence I had known most 
of my life.”102 His home community and the life that it and his family had provided for 
him functioned for Caputo more as something to escape from rather than something he 
wanted to honor in his service. He wanted to get away and prove to them and likely to 
himself that he could handle the duties of service, whatever he estimated them to be.  
Worries about his hometown and his family’s estimation of him follow Caputo 
through to basic training. While reminiscing about the drills he had to execute, he states 
that, “nothing [the drill sergeant] could do could be as bad as having to return home and 
admit to my family that I had failed. It was not their criticism I dreaded, but the 
emasculating affection and understanding they would be sure to show me.”103 Again it is 
not disapprobation for failing to uphold a family tradition that he fears, but rather a highly                                                         
100 Paul, Vietnam Letters, 9 
101 Caputo, A Rumor of War, xi (introduction) 
102 Caputo, A Rumor of War, 4 
103 Caputo, A Rumor of War, 10-11 
 71 
personal form of punishment and shame. He wants to escape the “safe, suburban 
existence” of his hometown for fear that it might leave untapped the depths of his nascent 
masculinity. Military service for Caputo thus becomes an opportunity to build his own 
self-respect.  
Caputo’s discussion of military identity coheres with this theme of war as a test of 
one’s manhood. While in basic training, comes to idolize the military uniform that he will 
potentially wear as a serviceman. It becomes an object not just of social distinction, but a 
way to exercise the demons of boredom that haunted him at home. He recounts how “a 
man who wore that uniform was somebody. He had passed a test few others could. He 
was not some down-on-his luck loser pumping gas or washing cars for a dollar-fifty an 
hour, but somebody, a Marine.”104 The uniform simultaneously represents conformity 
and escape.  
 Frank McCarthy, making numerous appearances in both of Al Santoli’s books 
about Vietnam, provides another good example of family influences in his interview in 
To Bear Any Burden: The Vietnam War and Its Aftermath in the Words of Americans and 
Southeast Asians. McCarthy served as a rifleman in the 1st Infantry Division, and was 
stationed in the Iron Triangle (near the boarder of South Vietnam and Cambodia, 
considered to be one of the most dangerous parts of the country in terms of VC 
resistance) from October 1965 – March 1967. In remembering his service and his initial 
reasons for wanting to go to war for his country, McCarthy remembers an eponymous 
uncle, “who was my role model as a child, was a career soldier. My mother divorced 
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when I was young. So I was gung ho all my life.”105 
Greg Skeels, a member of Charlie Company included in Charlie Company: What 
Vietnam Did To Us, remembers accepting his draft notice with little if any compunction. 
As the authors relate, Skeels’ draft notice106  
came in January 1968, and [he] accepted it as a condition of his life, as common 
to his crowd as marrying young and as inescapable as the weather… In his world, 
it was simply accepted that when the country called, men went, as generations had 
since the Revolution and as Skeels' own stepfather had in World War II. This is 
just something that happens to everybody, he thought in his turn when his papers 
came. 
Service in the Skeels family is a tradition, and questioning the possible effects of 
continuing the tradition simply never occurs. Survey evidence (as we’ll see in the final 
subsection of this section) coheres with this dynamic, and shows the power that a 
people’s history can have over their present and future.  
 
 
v. Conflict and the Thought of Desertion 
 
 
No account of the marshaling of American troops for service in the Vietnam 
War would be complete without a consideration of those who resisted it. I’ll include only 
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one example in this section, as I feel Tim O’Brien’s experience in deciding to serve in 
Vietnam encapsulates the mental anguish that some young men went through in making 
this decision.  
Historian Howard Zinn’s aphorism “you can’t be neutral on a moving train” 
provides a good intellectual backdrop for Tim O’Brien’s Vietnam memoir If I Die in a 
Combat Zone, Box Me Up and Ship Me Home. Zinn uses this credo as a title of one of his 
latter works, and also as a guiding philosophy through the study and transmission of 
American history. He exhorts “you” to proactively strive for social change rather than let 
the “moving train” silently yet assiduously carry you through your own life according to 
its own agenda. Tim O’Brien was subject to similar forces. When confronted with a set of 
forces, especially those originating from sources that are near and dear to us, that are 
nonetheless contradictory to our personal beliefs, what sort of decisions do we make? 
Tim O’Brien’s story provides us with a good starting point from which to answer this 
question in terms of fighting in the Vietnam War.  
Growing up in Worthington Minnesota, O’Brien received a fairly similar 
education (in the broadest sense) as Ron Kovic. Serving one’s country, with little if any 
regard given to what precisely was being asked, was a given – there was never a question 
of protest. Just as Kovic, O’Brien read the history books and watched the historical 
accounts in television and film of American participation in WWII, inculcating a deep 
devotion to his country and an absolute belief in its moral vindication in matters of 
foreign policy and war. To go down in the pages of history alongside those brave men 
who had stood up to fascism would have been a great honor to O’Brien and his friends.  
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In addition to his formal school education, his parents reinforced that same 
message. Their “talk was tough. Nothing to do with causes or reason; the war [in 
Vietnam] was right, they muttered, and it had to be fought.”107 Again we see an 
inclination in the older generation of Americans of O’Brien’s childhood toward the 
Stephen Decatur “my country, right or wrong” way of thinking. However, O’Brien 
remains skeptical at best, and downright antagonistic when it comes to the righteousness 
of the war.108 “I was persuaded then, and I remain persuaded now, that the war was 
wrong. And since it was wrong and since people were dying as a result of it, it was evil 
… But perhaps I was mistaken, and who really knew anyway?”109 Here, O’Brien tries to 
convince us, and himself, that his country’s rationale for war in Vietnam was so vague as 
to warrant a sort of default loyalty from its soldiers. His attempt results less from his own 
uncertainty, more from his own discomfort of fighting a war that is morally wrong. 
Nevertheless, “I submitted. All the soul searchings [sic] and midnight conversations and 
books and beliefs were voided by abstention, extinguished by forfeiture, for lack of 
oxygen, by a sort of sleepwalking default. It was no decision, no chain of ideas or 
reasons, that steered me into the war.”110 [ital. added] 
O’Brien appears to be so invested on a subconscious level with his country and its 
moral defensibility that he cannot stomach the thought of disloyalty. Thus, his evident 
pacifism before the war fails to fructify, and he marches off to war without peace of 
mind, but with conviction. This uncertainty, this hesitation that O’Brien overcomes in his                                                         
107 O’Brien, If I Die…, 12 
108 This antagonism, it should be mentioned, is thoroughly self-censored. At this point in his life, he does 
not want to bring his family shame by expressing how he really feels about the war. He feels a stronger tie 
towards his parents and his community then to personal conscience. 
109 O’Brien, If I Die…, 17 
110 O’Brien, If I Die…, 24 
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decision to serve becomes a burden for him to bear while in country. It will become, once 
he has been attuned to the harsh realities of warfare, a source of deep longing for comfort 
and emotional support.  
 
 
vi. Survey Data 
 
 
We’ve got the narratives, now lets take a look at some raw data. My survey 
elicited quantitative responses on a 1-7 scale (1 being complete disagreement and 7 being 
complete agreement, with 4 being neutrality) to 21 questions probing different aspects of 
each veteran’s service.111 On the Table 1 (below), I have listed responses from questions 
#6-#10. 112  As they demonstrate, there was an important distinction between the initial 
factors motivating the consent of those who would become infantrymen and those who 
would not. Perhaps the most important piece of data on this table is the response to 
question #9: “I understood the military objective of the United States in South Vietnam 
before I was deployed.” This shows how, for the average Vietnam veteran, questions 
concerning the moral aspect of the war were likely the last things on their mind. But, the 
difference between the two categories of respondents for this question (infantry/non-
infantry) shows that non-infantry servicemen were perhaps more invested in the war’s 
                                                        
111 A full list of the survey results is included in this project in appendices B and C.   
112 The statements are as follows: “I am from a military family.” (#6) “I am from a community were 
compelled military service is seen as a duty.” (#7) “I had reservations about enlisting (response only 
required for draftees.” (#8) “ I understood the military objective of the United States in South Vietnam 
before I was deployed.” (#9) “My service involved relatively frequent contact with enemy forces.” (#10) 
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general cause, or at least in staying informed about it. The other responses offer more 
definitive evidence on the differences between these two demographics. 
Questions #6 and #7 show that those who would eventually serve in non-infantry 
positions were more likely to have received a “military” upbringing, whether they were 
exposed to American military culture in their homes or in their communities at large. As 
we can see, even given the reservations that some of them held about going to war, these 
men consented to serve because they wanted to honor family traditions and uphold pre-
existing community values.  
Question #8 supports the idea that draftees bound for infantry service had more 
compelling reservations about the war than did those bound for non-infantry positions. 
Question #10 shouldn’t surprise us: infantrymen did the lion’s share of fighting in 
Vietnam. However, it should be realized that non-infantrymen, given the unclear division 
between VC/American held territory, were not free from the danger involved in the war.  
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Table 1 
 
 
 Infantry n=394 Non-Infantry n=1,084 
Question #6 5.2 6.1 
Question #7 5.8 6.3 
Question #8 5.5 n=112 4.5 n=285 
Question #9 1.9 2.3 
Question #10 6.6 3.2 
 
 
 
 
Important to note is that these questions probe the minds of veterans before they 
went to war. In section IV, we will see how these motivations change based on the 
distinction between Infantry and non-Infantry MOS.   
 
 What draws these men’s stories together, and what is the reason for listing them 
here in terms of this project? It is important to understand first that the people who fight 
in wars do so for many and variegated reasons, not all of which remain consistent 
throughout the entire span of their tours of duty. Family influences, one of the most 
powerful driving forces in anyone’s life, were certainly a big factor in many Vietnam 
veterans’ decisions to go to war. Conspicuously absent from many of these soldier’s 
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decisions to fight was a kind of moral calculus in the righteousness of the war’s strategic 
agenda, if not its moral purpose, and the survey data include in this section bear this 
claim out. This kind of consideration, I submit, and as the survey data suggests, was 
likely the last thing on the minds of this type of servicemen.  
While their families would remain crucial links back to the “real world” during 
their time in country, providing for many soldiers the only respite from an otherwise 
miserable existence, the second part of this project will advance evidence supporting the 
idea that family influences often became transmuted once the soldier in question became 
attuned to the real hardships of war. While these soldiers went to war believing that their 
service was something that affirmed both their membership in their families and their 
families’ status in their communities, they were often disabused of such pretenses after a 
short while in country. The motivational schemas that these men would then turn to is the 
subject of this project, and will be further enunciated in Section IV. In doing so, I’ll argue 
that the men with whom one served often played as important if not more important a 
role than one’s family in the process of ongoing consent as a part of Social Construct 
Consent Theory.  
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VI. SOCIAL CONSTRUCT CONSENT THEORY 
 
 
 
 
“You don’t know the horrible aspects of war. I’ve been through two wars and I know. 
I’ve seen cities and homes in ashes. I’ve seen thousands of men lying on the ground, their 
dead faces looking up at the skies. I tell you, war is Hell!” 
 -Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, in an address to the graduating class of the 
Michigan Military Academy in 1879 
 
"In a sense, we infantrymen were all rebels. We were the restless ones, the guys who 
were willing to take a chance. We were all draftees - USs, as Kumo had told the major 
back at the French Fort - whose service numbers began with US instead of RA, for 
regular army. We were the guys doing most of the fighting. The army didn't expect much 
out of us as long as we were willing to squeeze the trigger. Of the six hundred thousand 
men in-country when I was there, less than 20 percent were combat troops, the rest 
support. That’s the war the American army operates. Takes a lot of swimming pool 
guards and chauffeurs to keep the boys in the field… That's what the army's own figures 
stated. Of the 8.5 million Vietnam-era vets, 2.5 million saw service in 'Nam. Twenty 
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percent of that is 500,000. KIAs were about 50,000, wounded another 150,000. That's a 
40 percent chance you wouldn't get through the war without at least picking up a piece or 
two of shrapnel, if you were infantry." 
 -Norman Russell 
 
 
 As any veteran will likely tell you, the wars they fought in had little if any 
similarity with the war games they used to play in their backyards, or the heroic 
narratives they used to imagine. It is hard to imagine a more physically or spiritually 
enervating task than warfare. How did they cope? Or, what causes can we point to when 
seeking to explain their continued service throughout their tours of duty? Going AWOL 
in a country covered by thick and dangerous jungles was not an appealing choice for 
most soldiers, so even if they detested the requirements of their in-country duties, escape 
was not a viable option. This section advances evidence of an important aspect of 
infantrymen’s motivational schemata, what I’ll call Social Construct Consent Theory.  
Social Construct Consent Theory (SCCT) is an extrapolation of Peter Karsten’s 
Consent Theory as articulated in the introduction to this project. The main difference 
between the two theories is the temporal dimension of the former. SCCT attempts to 
explain the actions of servicemen not just in the initial phase of their military lives (e.g. 
their decisions to enlist/accept their draft duties), but extends the boundaries of 
consenting behavior to be observed and explained. Its strength lies in its power to explain 
not why men are willing to go to war, but why they are willing to maintain their 
commitment throughout their service. In this regard, SCCT looks for the immediate 
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influences on soldiers’ behavior while in the field, and attempts to formulate a schema 
wherein the behavior of individuals in separate units can be better understood.  
Other motivations for this theory come from the pre-existing body of research that 
has been performed on the veterans of the Vietnam War. Perhaps the most 
comprehensive is James R. Ebert’s A Life in a Year: The American Infantryman in 
Vietnam, 1965-1972. In a chapter entitled “Change and Coping,” Ebert details the 
methods by which infantrymen would adapt to their roles while in country, and would 
change along with the demands that were made of them by the war effort. His collection 
is expansive to say the least. Before I treat of his work, I’ll reference one fictional work 
about the Vietnam War by veteran Tim O’Brien, which introduces a lot of the 
information to which Ebert gives empirical support. As we already know, O’Brien served 
in Vietnam and returned home to write prodigiously and eloquently not only about his 
experience, but about the process of writing war memoirs in general. Early on in his 
fictional work The Things They Carried, he provides a description of the different items 
that his platoon-mates chose to carry as they were “humping” through the bush: 113 
The things they carried were largely determined by necessity. Among the 
necessities or near-necessities were P-38 can openers, pocket knives, heat tabs…. 
Henry Dobbins, who was a big man, carried extra rations; he was especially fond 
of canned peaches in heavy syrup over pound cake. Dave Jensen, who practiced 
field hygiene, carried a toothbrush, dental floss, and several hotel-sized bars of 
soap he’d stolen on R & R …. Until he was shot, Ted Lavender carried 6 or 7 
ounces of premium dope, which for him was a necessity. Mitchell Sanders, the 
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RTO, carried condoms. Norman Bowker carried a diary. Rat Kiley carried comic 
books. Kiowa, a devout Baptist, carried an illustrated New Testament... 
Later he describes how Dobbins even carried “his girlfriend’s pantyhose wrapped around 
his neck as a comforter.”114 Most importantly, “[t]hey all carried ghosts. When dark 
came, they would move out single file across the meadows and paddies to their ambush 
coordinates, where they would quietly set up the Claymores and lie down and spend the 
night waiting.”115 
 O’Brien’s prose is powerful, and evokes the human aspect of the war. The things 
that his platoon-mates carried helped them cope not with the physically challenging 
aspects of the war (its long route marches, laborious digging of foxholes and hazardous 
spelunking of potential VC hideouts), but rather with the psychological duress that plays 
such a big part in every soldiers’ story. The things they carried reminded them of home, 
reminded them that there was something else out there besides the miserable existence of 
the average infantryman. These things reminded O’Brien’s platoon-mates that, God 
willing, when they arrived home they would be greeted with open, loving arms. 
 The “ghosts” that O’Brien refers to represent the memories of things past that 
these soldiers bore with them through the jungle. These ghosts represented the fears, the 
anxieties, and in some cases the pathologies that precipitated the coping mechanisms that 
O’Brien and Ebert describe. To combat these ghosts, these men retreat into their own 
inner consciousness. By making conscious decision to alter the things they must tote 
along with them during their regular marches through the Vietnamese jungle, they are 
effectively hedging their bets against karma. Carrying extra weight through the jungle                                                         
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was a burdensome task, but these men likely felt that adding this extra task onto their 
daily labors not only shielded them from some kind of karmic reprisal, but also made sure 
that their loved ones, however far away, were still close with them in their time of need. 
Moreover, these things they carried tell us that above all else, these men were human 
beings, and as such were given to the same strange and illogical methods of thinking and 
reasoning as we are all at certain points in our lives. They affirm that whatever the duress 
thrust upon them by the war, they still maintained some functioning part of their 
humanity, and some connection to the real world, the world of their home and their loved 
ones.  
 Alongside this fictional account stands Ebert’s collection of the coping 
mechanisms of Vietnam infantrymen. He recounts how: 116 
most men conditioned themselves to function under fire and a few men came to 
enjoy it, there were a few for whom the stress of exposure to battle was simply 
too much. But fleeing the battlefield was not common in Vietnam if for no other 
reasons that that, in a war without fronts, soldiers had no way of knowing which 
way to run. Operating in isolated platoons and companies, most troops were too 
far from a rear area for men to entertain any hope of seeking safety there. Survival 
depended on staying with the group rather than running away from it. Only men 
in total panic took flight, and such instances were rare. 
In these dangerous circumstances, infantrymen were faced with a pretty grim fate. Many 
simply resigned themselves to suffer whatever the war would throw at them. By doing so, 
they117  
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attempted to reach a workable compromise between their unavoidable exposure to 
the dangers of combat and the almost overpowering desire to avoid that danger. 
So infantrymen assembled a vast array of mechanisms and attitudes that enabled 
them to cope with their dilemma. Coping often took the form of adopting 
precautionary behavior – positive actions in the field that helped soldiers stay alert 
and alive… some soldiers carried extra weapons or ammunition, whereas others 
faithfully wore helmets or flak jackets. In lieu of genuine ways to reduce their 
exposure to danger, soldiers often tried to allay their fears by treating the 
symptoms of their distress rather than the cause, which was beyond their ability to 
control. One such method was the observance of superstitions and the adoption of 
good-luck pieces. 
While I don’t want to assail the validity or the efficacy of these coping mechanisms, I 
am worried that Ebert has neglected to mention a very important one. What I’ve called 
Social Construct Consent Theory is qualitatively different than any of the methods that he 
has described, but I believe it produces the same results in a more efficient and more 
subtle fashion.  
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i. Social Construct Consent Theory in the Bush and Among the Grunts 
 
 
Before I get into the longer narratives included in this section, I’ll briefly go over 
some shorter stories that illustrate some key components of SCCT and the Vietnam War. 
Though these snippets of veteran experiences grossly understate their whole stories, they 
are good enough to ground us in the range of emotions and thoughts that infantrymen and 
others would have while in the field.  
 
From the earliest days during their time in country, grunts were taught, or 
otherwise learned, to care for their buddies. Not only were these men their only ticket 
home, they were their emotional and mental lifelines while in country. If they failed to 
protect them, they themselves were that much more likely to die or become unmoored. 
As William E. Merritt remembers in his memoir Where the Rivers Ran Backward, this 
theme ran through much of the five days of additional training he received when he first 
arrived in country. His drill sergeant was intent on drilling one firm principle into his 
head: 118 
Charlie’s everywhere out there. You think you gonna watch your own ass when 
you in the field? Ain’t no way. You buddy’s gotta do that. And you gotta watch 
his. God help you if you let anything happen to him. Don’t let a God damn FLY 
land on him. Feed him your C’s if he’s hungry. Carry him to safety when he’s 
hurt. Stand his watch when he’s tired. Kiss him when you go to bed at night and 
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kiss him when you wake up in the morning. Cause you ain’t NEVER gonna get 
home without him. 
The feelings of care and devotion espoused here are almost like that between a mother 
and her child. In protecting the latter, the former will often do things she otherwise 
wouldn’t. Such a dynamic is not so dissimilar from the one at play among many 
infantrymen in the field in Vietnam. Its effects oftentimes acted as the supreme coping 
mechanism and kept grunts fighting if for nothing else than to protect their buddies for 
whom they had developed such deep-seated love and affection.  
 This relationship is also exhibited by Luiz Martinez, Team Commander of the 
U.S. Marine Combined Action Platoon in Da Nang from July 1970 to July 1971. 
Commenting on how his Hispanic heritage affected the social dynamics of his platoon he 
dismisses its relevance: “in the Marines were no different than anybody else. When 
you’re in a war situation, everyone is green.”119 Robert Rawls, an African American 
rifleman in the 1st Cavalry Division (stationed at Tay Ninh from Early 1969 - early 1970) 
displays a similar crossing of the color line: 120  
[O]ne of my best friends was a white guy. There was no racism between him and 
me, nothing like that. That was mostly back in the rear. Out in the bush everybody 
was the same. You can't find no racism in the bush. We slept together, ate 
together, fought together. What else can you ask for? 
After he gets back from his tour, his marriage falls apart, and he goes through other 
readjustment issues. "I can't say now if I was one of the lucky ones. Sometimes I wish I 
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could've just went ahead and died with my friends."121 
 These relationships seem to run counter to some sentiments expressed by African-
American draftees before the war. In GI Diary, David Parks remembers the overt racism 
he experienced during his service. To him, it was122  
strange, all these guys gathered here from all over the States. It’s stranger still 
when you think that we are all going supposedly for the same cause – when half 
of us don’t have a decent word for the other half. When we stand out there and 
salute that flag, or march down the road to cadences, we’re together. 
Activist Malcolm X characterized the double-bind of the African-American soldier in 
Vietnam, a man who could not criticize the war because “we’re not supposed to say that. 
If we say that, we’re Anti-American, or we’re seditious, or we’re subversive, or we’re 
advocating something that’s not intelligent.”123 In comparing these differing accounts of 
the race relations surrounding the Vietnam War, one is left searching for a binding force 
that brings together these seemingly bifurcated accounts. 
 Perhaps the shift is best summed up by the example of Adolphus Stuart. Stuart, an 
African-American scout who served from April 1967 to March 1968, remembers 
experiencing the painful loss of a friend in combat after his friend was124  
shot in the neck and died from the loss of blood … helicopters were unable to 
extract the wounded in time. I can remember being very hurt at the death of my 
friend. He was white, by the way. But I cried like a baby. The way he died made it 
even worse. I had nightmares out there in the field, dreaming about killing a                                                         
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bunch of people in Saigon. I’ve never seen the place, but in my dreams I would go 
to the heart of where the shit hit, the nation’s capital, and cause havoc. 
We’ll see this type of dynamic and this type of reaction reiterated in Leroy TeCube’s 
experience in country. It is clear here that race takes a decided backseat to the bond that 
Stuart has formed with his white platoon-mate.  
 If Stuart did experience the negative side of racism in the field, it was in a context 
that provided him with the tools to confront it and move on. He recounts his racial 
confrontation in the field, when another platoon-mate inadvertently makes a racial slur in 
Stuart’s presence. However, Stuart rises above:125  
once we were in the field, there was no trouble. There was no color. I put my life 
on the line many a time trying to stop a white fool from doing something he was 
told not to do. And as a result of getting hurt, he exposed me to more danger. I 
hated that. And fortunately I was never in a apposition where someone had to do 
that for me. But I’m quite sure that they would have done the same for me.  
 
What could have effected this general change in race relations? Surely the war 
didn’t turn all its servicemen into completely tolerant people, but the circumstances of 
service effect a powerful force of social bonding. This force manifests itself in many 
different memoirs, and they are the focus of this project.  
 Before we move into the longer renderings of memoirs, I’ll mention two final 
examples: an officer who exhibits the effects of SCCT, and an infantryman who does not. 
Both present a clearer picture of the social effects of combat.                                                          
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Robert Santos was a platoon leader for 101st Airborne Division stationed in Hue 
from November 1967 - November 1968. Tasked with clearing the NVA out of Hue City 
in the wake of the Tet Offensive, his platoon performed numerous “anvil/hammer” 
operations to oust the NVA who had taken the city’s strongholds. His conception of 
patriotism is highly experienced based, rather than a vague, abstract notion. He describes 
it as126  
just loyalty to friends, people, families … [sic] I didn't even know those guys in 
Vietnam until I got there, and it wouldn't have mattered if you came to my 
platoon tomorrow - if we got hit, I would go out and try to save your ass just as I 
wouldn't done for anyone else I'd been with for a month, two months, three 
months. Instant bonding. 
His officer’s mindset of responsibility results in what might be considered deviant 
behavior in an effort to protect his men from harm. After a booby trap kills one of his 
men, Santos decides to burn down several hootches in a neighboring village he believes 
to be under VC control. As a major from the nearby division of the 1st Cavalry comes by 
and asks about what he is up to, Santos considers that his127  
responsibility would be, I think, somewhat complex. I had to uphold the traditions 
of military America, all that crap. I had to worry about my men. And I felt that 
responsibility goes down rather than up. I owed no allegiance to America. I owed 
no allegiance to the S-5 or the 1st Cav. and all that crap. I had to make sure that 
these thirty guys - which were never really thirty; eighteen or twenty-two - had to 
keep their head in line.                                                         
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Santos here has pinpointed the policy embraced by the top military brass and American 
presidents from Kennedy onward of 'winning the hearts and minds'. When such an ideal 
competes with the safety of the military force that is supposed to be winning the war, 
Santos very easily defaults to protecting his men, and carrying out an important directive 
as an officer: protect these men while leading them in the systematic killing of Viet Cong 
soldiers. Though Santos is an officer (and thus his procession in adhering to the group 
norms is understated in comparison to the regular infantrymen in this project), I include 
him as an exemplar of a soldier who, by embracing his unit as a whole, finds motivation 
to fight.  
 Frank McCarthy continues this pattern, and describes his association with his 
fellow platoon mates as follows:128  
We had a tremendous amount of esprit de corps. For a year we learned everything 
about the 1st Division and all its traditions and great battles, being the first in 
combat. The D-day Normandy invasion, Italy, Africa … they were everywhere 
and just great. We were going to carry on that tradition. 
Even before they are assigned missions in country, the tradition of McCarthy’s company 
binds him together not only with the other members present, but connects him with all 
those men who have served in the 1st Division before him.  
After the platoon loses some men after a mine is tripped, the effects of these 
connections are borne out. 11 men in total are killed in this episode from early in 
McCarthy’s tour (which lasted from October 1965 to March 1967), a loss that129  
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absolutely enraged [us] because for the previous years we had all been very close. 
Every weekend our families would visit. We knew guys’ wives, mothers, and 
fathers, their kids. And when they died it enraged us. We wanted to find the VC 
and kill them. But at that point it was very difficult to find them. 
We’ll see this kind of virulent reaction again when we return to Leroy TeCube’s narrative 
below.  
 
Exemplars like Santos and McCarthy can be profitably contrasted with a soldier 
like James Hebron, a scout sniper in the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, stationed at Khe Sanh 
from August 1967 to February 1968. Hebron describes feeling isolated from the group of 
soldiers he served with, as he was a singular replacement for the platoon. He speaks 
about how he130  
never got that sense of unit camaraderie It took so long to develop it… That kind 
of tightness should be developed in combat units to delay any kind of problems in 
a hot LZ. You know from the way the guy is behaving what is happening, you 
sort of read between the lines. It takes a long time to develop that. It just doesn't 
happen if you are going in as individual replacements. It just isn't there. It's like 
being new on the block… 
This failure to be accepted into the group results in his starkly individualistic conception 
of his service in the war. He describes the feeling of having an enemy in his sights as a131  
sense of power of looking down a barrel of a rifle at somebody and saying, 'Wow, 
I can drill this guy.' Doing it is something else too [sic]. You don't necessarily feel                                                         
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bad; you feel proud, especially if it's one on one, he has a chance. It's the throw of 
a hat. It's the thrill of the hunt. If you just keep it at that and don't go closer and try 
to anthropomorphize them and take pictures, it is all pure symbolism at that point. 
Indeed, an internal and symbolic representation of his combat works best for Hebron as 
he was not, while stationed at Khe Sanh, one of the “buddies”. Rather, he was an outsider 
sent in to replace a fallen comrade of the original set. Additionally, he was a sniper, and 
was assigned mostly solo missions at night. The demands of his assignments did not 
cohere with most others in the platoon, and thus he did not find much strength from the 
collective care that the platoon had for its members. His consent is of a profoundly 
different nature than that of most infantrymen described in this project. His view of the 
war begins and ends within his own mind; it is completely self-contained. The strength 
that is precluded from him by his platoon-mates becomes replaced with something more 
akin to a survival instinct, where his actions are justified as necessary to preserve his own 
well-being. 
 With these brief examples in mind, I will now delve into some longer accounts 
from veterans that show the effects of SCCT.  
 
Following Leroy TeCube’s story in country, a similar trend makes itself apparent. 
Doing what, in the author’s estimation, “we had to do”132 becomes an exercise in SCCT. 
Tracking his experience through his year in country provides us with many great 
examples of how this theory can be readily applied to the ongoing process of an 
infantryman’s coping and combatting the spiritually debilitating hardships of war.  
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TeCube gets his orders to report to the Americal Division (11th brigade, 4th of the 3rd 
infantry battalion), a division about which he is shortly thereafter educated extensively. 
When he first gets to his post in Chu Lai, his sergeant gives him and his platoon-mates a 
brief history of the Americal Division, including its founding in WWII, and a syllabus of 
its merits in American military history.  
Though it’s unclear whether this introduction finds any purchase with TeCube, if 
it does, he doesn’t mention it. He is more focused on getting to know his platoon-mates. 
Upon receiving all of this new information about the war and their role in it, the men of 
the 23rd Infantry discuss their prospects. One GI, whom TeCube befriends and becomes 
close with over the course of the next year responds, when asked what he would do when 
he had to shoot a VC replies: "Me, I don't want to kill anyone."133 TeCube describes him 
as "exemplif[ying] the average GI in the Vietnam War. He has been drafted. He was 
white and about nineteen years of age. He was of medium statue, and you could tell he 
had had a proper upbringing." Finally, GIs like Ladd had "the discipline needed to carry 
out orders."134 This description suggests that TeCube feels like something of an outsider 
to the norm of infantrymen like Ladd. Through his experience fighting alongside such 
men in his unit, he will become more comfortable identifying with them as equals.  
When TeCube first meets his platoon-mates, it takes them a matter of minutes to 
dub him with the sobriquet of "Chief," to which TeCube makes an interesting 
observation: 135 
Most of the guys would call me Chief from then on, although a handful of 
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individuals called me by my real name. Up until that moment throughout my 
training no one even suggested calling me Chief. I wondered why that was so. 
Perhaps because as trainees we were used to being treated as animals and were 
addressed by our last names. Now here in Vietnam everyone had an identity. 
This phenomenon might be compared to the nicknaming process that social fraternities or 
other such camaraderie-engendering groups go through to establish clear identities and 
relationships for their membership. Perhaps TeCube has never been accepted by 
conventional society before (as he describes Ladd to be the exemplar of) and thus 
appreciates the acceptance of his platoon-mates even if it is based on a cultural 
stereotype. This feeling will become a source of strength throughout his entire tour.  
TeCube’s experience combines this intra-unit social dynamic with the exigencies 
of war. He takes an unusual interest in the culture of the Vietnamese peasants that his 
platoon comes across in the jungle, taking note of their agricultural practices and their 
diet. Though he spends a considerable amount of time recounting this information, it is 
only to rudely awaken us with a report from a firefight near the same village he had been 
observing. One of his platoon-mates, Guthrie, points out a heap of dead bodies left over 
from the skirmish. "At that instant," he thought, "I fully realized what war was all about. 
In the most simple terms it was merely kill or be killed."136 This mantra of “kill or be 
killed” is in many ways the harsh reality of an infantryman. TeCube’s membership status 
among his unit, as we will see, contributes directly to the willingness with which he 
accepts this decision as his duty in Vietnam.  
After his first firefight, TeCube is rattled, but sustained. Like most of the rest of 
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his platoon, this is the first time TeCube has had to fire his weapon at the enemy, and he 
becomes aware of the disconnect between the idealized and the actual difficulty soldiers 
often have with firing their weapon at the enemy. Nevertheless, he does fire rounds in the 
general direction of the VC from his foxhole until they beat a retreat. "When the shooting 
subsided I felt a great sense of relief. Not from the idea of shooting to kill, but from being 
a team player. I knew then that I would do my part in the fight."137 This is quite an 
important observation from TeCube in terms of SCCT. His real fears in this war reside 
less in his personal competency to fire his weapon and kill his enemy, but in being 
considered outside of the group of men in his platoon, of being considered an outsider 
from their social constructs. He translates between firing at the VC during a firefight and 
acceptance into this construct with acute facility.  
After experiencing the loss of the first member of the platoon, (who was also a 
friend from his days in basic training at Ft. Polk) TeCube expresses another important 
element of the SCCT: "Charlie believed that such casualties caused us to fear him. In 
reality it only made us more resentful of him. None of us was scared, and we became 
intent on revenge."138 This intent drives TeCube and, as we will see, his platoon-mates to 
avenge their fallen comrades in battle. The emotional valence of warfare is one that here 
repeats itself in something like an infinite feedback loop, and the bonds that TeCube has 
formed with these comrades make the subsequent reprisals all the swifter.  
In describing combat, TeCube refers to an "animal" that would come out of him 
and drive him to kill the opposing VC. Oftentimes, this "animal" was born in the wake of 
the death of a good buddy or some other circumstance imbued with similar pathos. Later,                                                         
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when he hears reports of the My Lai massacre (perpetrated in a different section of 
"Pinkville" than where his platoon was stationed) in March 1968, he interprets it in these 
terms: 139  
On the day of the My Lai Massacre the situation was ripe for the animal to 
emerge. Unfortunately, at My Lai it appears that the animal completely took over 
not just one individual, but a whole unit. When it did, the men were unable to stop 
it until it was too late… 
In this description of the My Lai massacre, TeCube couches the episode in terms of what 
these men were willing to do for their buddies. This description presents the more 
dangerous side of SCCT, when executing military orders results in the deaths of innocent 
women and children. While it is likely a hard truth for TeCube to bear, he has been 
motivated by the same factors that he believes motivated the My Lai massacre.  
 Nevertheless, TeCube’s time in country gives us a great example of the effects of 
SCCT. If he initially had misgivings about participating in Vietnam, they were quickly 
allayed by the thought that his service was both a defense of his fellow infantrymen and 
also an affirmation of his own identity as part of his unit.  
 
John Ketwig offers a similar story of relying on one’s fellow infantrymen when in 
need. He perhaps presents an even starker example of the power of SCCT in lieu of his 
initial feelings about the war and the priority of national service. As he states in the 
introduction, he “didn’t ask to go to The Nam,” and he “wish[es] [he]’d never seen the 
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things [he] did.”140 Chillingly, he ends the introduction with the confession: “I don't want 
my children to see the world I have known."141 Nonetheless, the memories of Vietnam 
possess deep emotional valence for Ketwig, and he ends the introduction by confessing 
that he. This begs the question of just why Ketwig wants to revisit this painful portion of 
his life.  
Is the truth of Vietnam possibly too much for his children to bear? Whatever the 
answers to this question, Ketwig's nostalgia142 for his time in Vietnam is both something 
abhorrent and necessary, something that he feels must be preserved in writing for future 
generations, but must also be guarded from those generations because of its sheer 
unpalatability. These feelings about his past hint at the deep emotional quagmire that the 
war had become for him, and are thus a fertile ground in which to form bonds of 
friendship with the other men around him.  
 Unwillingness to perform received national duty is a major theme of the memoir, 
and Ketwig wants to demonstrate how he got through his deep reservations about serving 
in Vietnam. He begins the memoir with a quote from Benjamin Franklin:143 
It has been for some time a generally received opinion that a military man is not 
to inquire whether a war be just or unjust; he is to execute his orders. All princes 
who are disposed to become tyrants must probably approve of this opinion…. but 
is it not a dangerous one? Since, on that principle, if the tyrant commands his 
army to attack and destroy not only an unoffending neighbor nation but even his 
own subjects, the army is bound to obey… the slavery then of a soldier is worse                                                         
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than that of a negro. 
It is clear that Ketwig agrees with this characterization of the military man. In being 
drafted, his fear of losing his individuality and free will begins to mount, manifesting in 
deviant behavior while in basic training at Fort Dix. During this time, he took pride in 
flouting the dictates of the Drill Instructors; spending mere seconds longer during his 
meal times than was allotted "was [his] secret, [his] token individuality, and they were 
never able to strip it away."144 
 After making the trip across the Pacific, he is stationed in the Central Highlands 
near Pleiku. Had he been near the coast, Ketwig would have “tried to swim east til [he] 
drowned.”145 He later claims that he “felt no sense of duty”146 upon arriving in country.  
However, this attitude changes after a few months in country. Upon arriving in Pleiku, he 
meets a few men who he had known in basic training. He remarks how "it was good to be 
with old friends in this hostile and depressing environment."147 After time, he grows 
closer to his platoon-mates. They become a social safety net in which he can trust and 
grow to cope with his time in the war. They “showed [him] how to tuck in the mosquito 
net to make it rat proof, how to lay out [his] combat gear in case Charley paid us a visit in 
the night, and how to shave in the dim glow of a candle."148 
 
Like Ludwig Wittgenstein before them, these men experience the common plight 
of excruciating drudgery that goes along with being an infantryman. Whatever its 
negative effects, it also serves to bind them together under the collective identity of                                                         
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infantrymen. In this identity, they find strength. Ketwig muses at great length about the 
hardships of war:149  
How would you react? Would you survive? In one piece? Every second brought 
you nearer to it. How would you die? Loved ones were far, far away; almost a 
fantasy. In their place you had come to love the guys, the buddies. You knew you 
were all experiencing the most horrendous, dangerous, profound experience of 
your lives. As the strongest steel is tempered by fire, you knew the friendships 
made in this pressure-cooker atmosphere were special. 
Still he is able to partially redeem his time there in virtue of the friendships that he has 
developed simply by being associated with other men stuck with a similar fate.  
When an opportunity arises to drive a truck in a convoy heading to nearby Dak 
To, Ketwig volunteers because he wants to seize this opportunity and control his own fate 
in the war, rather than letting the war approach him unawares:150 
In my comfortable youth, I had never been forced to face a situation of such 
awesome importance. The tension had grown unbearable. I had to know how I 
would act under fire; and the convoy offered the opportunity to find out. Today. 
In a few hours. The opportunity to find end the agonizing waiting, and to face 
both Charley and myself, out on the road to Dak To, away from my friends. If I 
failed, I would not directly threaten the guys…. If I have to meet the Viet Cong, 
let it be at the steering wheel. 
While he still seeks other ways of avoiding an undignified fate, Ketwig still considers the 
safety of his platoon-mates in making this decision.                                                          
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One last piece of John Ketwig’s story to consider is the antagonism that he 
develops for the Army administration. While this might not be as surprising for someone 
like Ketwig (as opposed to someone like Sgt. Allen Paul, who was pretty gung-ho before 
he went to Vietnam), it does continue the trend of infantrymen bonding with their fellow 
servicemen while becoming detached from the formal administrative side of the Army. 
While jawing with another infantryman in the Kontum Highlands, Ketwig considers what 
the arrangements might look like if he were to die in Vietnam. "I hadn't thought about it. 
If I went home in a box, I didn't want the army involved in my funeral. Fuck 'em. I hadn't 
asked for any of this. I wasn't a hero. I would have to write to the folks, tell them not to 
allow a military funeral."151 Ketwig’s determination to escape the auspices of the military 
show that his service, while binding him close to some, has alienated him even more 
from others.  
 John Ketwig further demonstrates the power of SCCT. While he was blatantly 
unwilling to adhere to a military culture in basic training, he proved much more amenable 
to associating with the men with and for whom he fought. Thus, his service was likely a 
defense of his buddies first and foremost, considerations of national duty and patriotism 
notwithstanding.  
 
 In 1978, Sgt. Allen E. Paul published a collection of letters he had written to both 
his mother and father and his girlfriend Beverly while in training and serving in Vietnam. 
He was deployed to Vietnam about ten years prior, in April of 1968, arriving back to 
America approximately one year afterwards. 
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 His letters demonstrate a reversal in opinions of sorts, but certainly not one 
engaged in the stated ideological reasons that President Lyndon Baines Johnson had for 
escalating American involvement in Vietnam in 1964. He states quite unequivocally that 
his letters "ha[ve] nothing to do with the political aspects of the war or the foreign policy 
of the times." They are "just one man's story of the war and how he saw it."152  
 Despite this, Paul's example provides an interesting and instructive narrative of 
faith and disillusionment and the resulting mindset of someone who has gone through 
such an experience. His time in Vietnam is a good example of SCCT given his huge 
desire to be part of a certain division even before his tour begins. As we’ll see, this desire 
quickly becomes a stronger motivator of his service than his overall allegiance to his 
country’s war effort. While Paul entered the war believing in the righteousness of 
national service and holding somewhat glorified ideas about the 1st Cavalry Division in 
which he would eventually serve, he came to question the methods by which the 
American military was pursuing their goal in South Vietnam by the end of his service. 
His story illustrates another piece of the SCCT. 
 Prominent in the first letters Paul sends home during basic training is his desire to 
be a member of the 1st Cavalry Division. In a letter dated Nov. 5 1967, he hails them as 
an exalted division in the Army, saying, "the 1st Cav. really has beaten ass this past week 
in Nam. My Boys!! I hope."153 As he is shipped out, he tells his parents, in a letter on the 
26th of April, 1968 to "keep [their eyes] on the news for the 1st Cav."154 Upon first 
arriving in country, Paul notes the relatively buoyant morale of the men he is with, 
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chalking it up to a common identity in the Division: "The moral of most of the men 
seems pretty high. In fact, I'm quite surprised, but this fact might be because we are in the 
1st Cav. - I don't know. I had my 1st Cav. combat patch put on my fatigues and it really 
makes you feel a little pride in yourself, even if you have to go through this hell to get 
it."155 While this is never made clear in the collection, Paul likely has had previous 
exposure to this division, causing membership in it to be a strong modeling and 
motivating factor for him as a volunteer. 
 Paul's memories are not immune to the more unseemly aspects of the war. After 
spending a few months in country, he begins to describe the American presence in South 
Vietnam more as an occupational than a liberation force. "At times," he writes in a letter 
to Beverly in early July, "this place reminds me of Paris under the Nazi occupation 
because we do whatever we want, and the people really have no say about their own 
welfare or their country's. Its always the people that suffer the most when their country 
comes under military occupation."156 He makes a crucial change in his MOS while in 
Vietnam, switching from his position as an artilleryman to operating a radio in the field 
alongside the infantry. Among the reasons that he lists - boredom, rank, money - is a new 
status with the 2nd unit of the 5th Cavalry Division, or as Paul puts it, "the unit that 
relieved Khe Sanh."157 Apparently fed up with the anonymity of his job on the artillery 
squad and desirous of a job where he can participate in what can very loosely be called 
the more "social" aspects of the war, Paul becomes exposed to how the fight was being 
carried out in the jungles and hamlets of Vietnam in the most minute detail. What he 
                                                        
155 Paul, Vietnam Letters, 18 
156 Paul, Vietnam Letters, 65 
157 Paul, Vietnam Letters, 66 
 103 
experiences in this new position will eventually drive him to seriously reconsider his 
allegiance to certain aspects of the American military.  
 His closer contact with the uglier side of war and the sight of casualties amongst 
the platoon he follows prompts a closer examination of the human cost of the war; he 
begins to wonder if such a cost is justified compared to what is being accomplished. In 
collecting the remains of the pilots from two downed Hueys, Paul is struck by grief: "I 
feel so sorry for their families - at times it all seems so senseless to me!"158 In his later 
letters, these antagonisms take a more palpable shape. Saying at one point that he "hate[s] 
the army and the war,"159 he even goes so far as to dream about a book he wants to write, 
a compilation of all of the notes that he has taken in the field which would "not be in 
favor of this damn war."160161 This antagonism stems not from any ideological opposition 
to the war's cause, but rather from negative responses to what Paul sees as inefficiency 
and incompetence on the part of the officer class. He develops an especially virulent 
dislike of the officer class, writing to his parents that he has "seen some of the poorest 
examples of leadership over here, and [that he's] surprised that more men have not been 
killed because of their stupidity!!"162 Whether Paul ever begins to question the 
motivations of the war, as opposed to criticizing its prosecution, remains unclear. In a 
letter address on January 13, 1969, he recounts "[seeing helicopters] bring in more dead 
G.I.'s, and I always ask the question Why? I just can't understand it."163 What remains 
clear is his somewhat hostile attitude taken towards the prosecution of the war and its                                                         
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moral cost both in terms of American and Vietnamese lives.  
 Paul arrives back in the United States on April 18, 1969. His letters don’t provide 
much evidence of his last thoughts on the war, but we can safely assume that he received 
an honorable discharge. In remembering the war, he shows a more definitive allegiance 
to his division and its collective identity while criticizing the broader costs of the war. It 
is likely that Paul is able to maintain these two standards because of the pride that he 
shares with other members of his unit.  
 
These long narratives are valuable for the perspectives they provide both on the hardships 
of war and the relief provided by the fellowship of one’s buddies. To further draw out 
this point, I’ll look at two great accounts of what was perhaps the most storied company 
of the Vietnam War.  
 
 
ii. Charlie Company 
 
 
"We were the unwilling working for the unqualified to do the unnecessary for the 
ungrateful. This is about as truthful as you can get."  
-Kit Bowen of Charlie Company, in a letter to his father, 1968, from Charlie 
Company 
 
 In the existing memoirs of the Vietnam War, many make references to Charlie 
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Company as being one of the most well-known of all companies under the umbrella of 
MACV (Military Assistance and Control, Vietnam). I’ll initiate this discussion with two 
memoirs from members of Charlie Company. Both make similar arguments, but arrive at 
their conclusions by dissimilar routes. What is common between them is a running theme 
of the company’s collective identity as being highly valuable in the minds of its 
membership. The men of Charlie Company took pride in being a part of this storied 
company, even if in the context of a war for which they had mixed feelings.  
 In Charlie Company: What Vietnam Did To Us, co-authors Peter Goldman and 
Tony Fuller speak in passionate detail about their tours of duty as members of this 
hallowed group. They tell stories of men at war and boys at play, and paint a picture of 
their times in Vietnam filled with bravery and fear, duty and camaraderie. Altogether, 
there book is an excellent stepping stone towards grasping the mentalities that existed in 
many different companies throughout Vietnam, and are likely observable in war as a 
human endeavor.  
 Before getting into the positive descriptions of Charlie Company, Goldman and 
Fuller couch their story in general terms of the war context. The story of Charlie 
Company164 
is not military history in any formal sense; it is not, that is, the record of general 
staffs and grand strategies, or of territory seized and held, or of great battles won 
or lost. Vietnam was not that sort of war, and Charlie Company’s piece of it was 
fought over bloodied patches of ground that could not be found on maps and that 
nobody really wanted anyway. 
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In this general respect, this description of Charlie Company is a metaphor for the focus of 
this project as a whole. It deliberately focuses on the experiences of only a certain set of 
men who served in Vietnam, namely, the infantry, or those who did most of the fighting 
and dying. While the names of the general and political leaders make it more often into 
the history books, the perspective of the infantryman, as I’ve stated before, should not be 
ignored. It can demonstrate for us fascinating aspects of military history not evident in 
studying only the famous campaigns, battles, and those who called the shots throughout.  
 After making this opening point, Goldman and Fuller begin to establish the 
credentials of Charlie Company, describing its tough assignment and its even tougher 
membership. Assigned a particularly hostile part of the country,165 the men of Charlie 
Company “made, and for a time basked in, a barracks notoriety as a rough, tough, take-
no-prisoners fighting force that seemed to trail trouble in its magnetic field. When 
another company would get in a jam and have to be lifted out by chopper, it was Charlie 
Company that went back for the bodies."166 And they weren’t just rowdy and dangerous; 
they were tough as nails. The red shoulder patch of Charlie Company became in the 
minds of its membership a coveted possession, a definitive mark of toughness tested and 
masculinity proven. As Goldman and Fuller had been told during their orientation 
presentation to Charlie Company: 167 
It was said in Charlie Company that the Big Red One shoulder patch was born the 
day a doughboy in the Great War caught a piece of shrapnel in the ass, ripped off 
a fragment of what was left of his underpants, daubed a numeral '1' on it with his                                                         
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own blood and fixed it to his sleeve. The division brought back five Medals of 
Honor from that war, winning what some historians consider the turn-of-the-tide 
battle at a wayside town in France called Cantigny. It rang up sixteen more 
cutting a swath of fire across North Africa, Sicily, France, Belgium, and Germany 
in World War II. 
So, not only did Charlie Company achieve a particular identity during the Vietnam War, 
but its membership had an entire history of military success and glory upon which to base 
their identity. By informing men of the history of their companies, the collective identity 
became something that infantrymen in Vietnam could grasp as real.  
By establishing this kind of identity, the men of Charlie Company reinforced a 
normativity that prescribed for new members a certain set of accepted behaviors and 
attitudes. To truly be a member of Charlie Company was not just a matter of being 
assigned, but rather assimilating this group identity of toughness and rowdiness. This 
common identity bound the men of Charlie Company together, and made them fiercer 
defenders of the identity and the buddies that they made.  
Friendships were a powerful source of strength in Vietnam, but also a palpable 
risk. There was, in the context of hot war, “something leveling about 'Nam with its 
democracy of death.” As a result, the sheer fact of service in such a context “made 
friendship hard because there were too many painful goodbyes.” However, it remained a 
necessity if for nothing else than to palliate the struggle. In “'Nam,” you needed 
friendship “because you needed friends to survive."168 “Survival,” then, can be taken here 
in two different senses. First, in its biological sense, your buddies in the bush, as we saw 
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with William E. Merritt, were your unofficial bodyguards. Second, in its psychological 
sense, your buddies in the bush provided solace not only through companionship, but also 
through their supporting roles as members of the same collective identity.  
The combination of friendships formed and collective identity embraced was born 
out in the after-hours antics of Charlie Company. Of course, in a war like that in Vietnam 
there were no true periods of ceasefire, VC ambushes and mortar attacks often occurring 
at night. However, in whatever downtime Charlie Company could secure while in 
country, Goldman and Fuller recall a pretty raucous time. The men were “raucous as frat 
boys and mean as snakes, nearly as fearsome to the cadre on their own home base as they 
were to the VC out in the boonies…” After the  “last truck would clear, and the MPs, in 
tribute to the company’s feral reputation, would draw the concertina wire across the road 
behind them – as if to say, okay … we don’t want you people going anywhere, and if 
anybody escapes, we’re gonna kill you.”169 The men reveled in this type of treatment by 
their superiors, as it affirmed everything that made it desirable to be a member of Charlie 
Company. Just as they were special in the field given their reputation for toughness and 
effectiveness, they were revered as wild and crazy partiers, who needed to be quarantined 
during their downtime.  
These downtime parties were also an important crucible wherein intra-company 
unity was forged. Such periods of their tours were:170  
where the men of Charlie Company were permitted to be boys again – to be as 
rowdy as hell week at the Deke (Delta Kappa Epsilon) house and as macho as a 
street gang defending its turf. Sometimes they would turn deadly serious, in boozy                                                         
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imitation of the war they had left behind in the bush… But mostly the sport at Lai 
Khe [a party haunt of Charlie Company] was of a post-adolescent sort, half beer 
bust and half pot party, drinking or smoking in part to forget where you were and 
in part so you could brag the morning after about how wrecked you had got the 
night before. It was all for laughs, and sometimes the quality of the wit could be 
unmercifully strained… 
This type of carousing played an incomparable role in binding units together, and in 
intertwining men’s fates to the others with whom they served. It was here that they could 
unwind and get to act ‘normal,’ normalcy being defined as everything that you couldn’t 
do when on official duty. Goldman and Fuller note this attitudinal dichotomy in saying 
that the men:171 
were boys at play in those interludes when the war did not require them to be 
men; their sport and their memory of it were all beer, smoke, and braggadocio. 
But there was a strain of desperation to their comedy as well, a primal scream of 
laughter in the valley of the shadow of death. You would party all night … but in 
the morning you had to shake off your hangover, go over to headquarters and take 
care of business. 
So, friendships were formed, and the collective identity of the company was strengthened 
both by combat and in downtime. Whatever the context, Charlie Company made sure that 
any time spent went towards hardening the social ties between its membership. As these 
ties strengthened, service for their participants became that much easier. This is not to say 
that one’s buddies eliminated completely the struggle of military service, but simply 
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made it more tolerable.  
 So, if Goldman and Fuller present a story of hardships combatted with the 
establishment and embracing of a desirable reputation among a company of men, 
Norman L. Russell in his memoir Suicide Charlie: A Vietnam War Story, paints a similar 
picture but with different colors. Nonetheless, the collective identity of Charlie Company 
surely played a very important role in the lives and perspectives of its members. They did 
not rely, as the men described by Tim O’Brien in the above passage from The Things 
They Carried, on solely internal factors to help them through this difficult time in their 
lives. In many ways, their service was motivated by those who went through the 
experience with them, and the bonds of friendship and love that were so thoroughly 
created based on that shared experience.  
 Suicide Charlie: A Vietnam War Story gives us a more personal account of what 
Goldman and Fuller are seeking to describe: the collective identity of Charlie Company 
in Vietnam, and how that identity affected the behavior of the company’s membership. 
Written by Norman L. Russell in 1993, this account presents in beautiful prose his 
experience being drafted and trained, and eventually serving from 1968 to 1969. Like 
other veterans cited in this project (Kovic, O’Brien), Russell chooses to present certain 
episodes of his service as anachronisms. Before we hear about his life before the war or 
his experience in basic training, he gives us his first impression on joining Charlie 
Company, or as he will come to know it “Suicide Charlie,” in the field:172 
All through the first day, and the second we chopped at the hard soil, burrowing 
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into the ground with the instructive determination of dung beetles. Charlie 
Company, 4th of the 9th, was the name of my unit. Suicide Charlie, more 
commonly. A company of survivors. They'd come by their name honestly. Three 
weeks before, they had lost most of their comrades in an ambush. It wasn't the 
first time. We were the replacements for dead men. 
It’s important to note that Russell will refer to the company almost universally by the 
sobriquet of “Suicide Charlie” for the rest of the memoir. It becomes a persona for him, 
something that he can become part of along with the other men in the company. Russell 
places this episode early in the memoir, deliberately throwing off the linearity of his 
memory to emphasize this point. He was not primarily an individual fighting in Vietnam, 
but a member of the storied “Suicide Charlie” Company, and he wants his reader to 
remember this. As he progresses through the memoir, the initial misgivings Russell had 
about his service in Vietnam develop into palpable antagonisms. In many ways, 
membership in Suicide Charlie plays a key part in Russell’s confrontation with his own 
rebelliousness and moral unease with what he is required to do.  
 Before I say more about Russell’s development while in country, I’ll give a little 
background information about who Russell was before he went to war. This will help 
illuminate some of his behavior during his tour. Early in the memoir, he recalls a 
conversation he had with a Navy enlistee from his hometown named John. In the 
conversation, John questions Russell about his recently being drafted: “What are you 
going to do Norm? Go to Canada? Go to jail?” As Russell well knows, “His real question 
goes unspoken, but I know what he’s thinking. It’s been on all of our minds. Do I think 
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that I could kill?”173 This question will resurface again as Russell goes through the 
tumultuous process of reconciling with being drafted. It appears that he does not have the 
same kind of community- or family-based influences that Lewis Puller did. If he does, 
they are clearly not having the same effect.  
 The images of the war that he sees on television exacerbate Russell’s self-doubt. 
Still, he will eventually decide to answer the draft for what he considers humanitarian 
reasons:174 
I watched the carnage on the nightly news like most everyone else, and the sight 
of it sickened me. I had my doubts about the War, and I didn't want to go to some 
appendix-shaped country halfway around the world to be maimed, killed, or 
turned into a mental basket case because President Lyndon Johnson had an ego 
twice the size of Texas. But I couldn't duck out on my duty and let some other 
poor bastard of fight in my place just because I was scared. 
Though he is unwilling to fight, the shame of having someone else die in his place 
because of this unwillingness functions as the trump card in this deliberation. He reports 
to Fort Benning in Georgia basic training ready for his duty, however fearful of what it 
might require of him. If Russell is to be believed here, these views will have serious 
implications for his behavior while in the field and his willingness to take another life 
when ordered to do so.175  
 At basic training, Russell begins the process of cohering to a group norm.                                                         
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Throughout his marching drills, he remarks about the feeling of abnegation that emerges 
along with the training regimen. While marching in the Georgia heat, “we learned to 
submerge our individuality into that of the group – and to someone who often had been 
cast in the role of outside it felt damn good to be part of a team.”176 This remark is 
potentially key, as it is the first signpost that Russell is embracing rather than rejecting 
the group-oriented attitude of military service. His affections for his fellow servicemen 
begin to grow while still in training, and he values the friendships he forges with them. 
For several of his fellow boot camp trainees he:177 
took the opportunity to discuss the reasoning behind their enlistments…. They all 
gave pretty much the same answer. They came from poor families who lived in 
small rural towns and had no chance of going to college or finding a meaningful 
career. Rather than live a lifetime of punching the cash register at the local five & 
dime, they had taken the army up on its offer to let them see the world. It all made 
sense to them, but I remained unconvinced, unable to comprehend fully why 
anyone would voluntarily dress in uniform, put up with constant verbal abuse, and 
give up total control of his or her life to do so. 
So, while he still appreciates being included as a member of the military, he is still 
hesitant to devote himself fully to the cause. The violence involved with military duty 
still keeps him partially alienated from the other people in training. Where he could build 
solidarity with them based on their common backgrounds, he remains somewhat aloof, 
unwilling to submit to the group mentality. However, he does attempt to build bridges 
with other soldiers who he feels might share his plight. After a day out on the firing                                                         
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range, Russell concludes that “It's one thing to fire at pop-up targets on the rifle range, 
another to shoot at an actual human being…. Many soldiers, from the sounds of it, lacked 
the requisite fierceness to pull the trigger. And paid for it, immediately."178 
 While he is unable to get over his hesitation in using deadly force, the undertones 
of someone longing for social support are definitely there. It will take Suicide Charlie to 
really establish Russell’s net of support when he most needs it. His time in country will 
test both his ability to trust others and to trust himself.  
 Russell gets stationed in the with “C” Company of the 25th Infantry Division in 
the Iron Triangle, the same geographic location that Goldman and Fuller described, about 
100 miles north of Saigon and close to the Cambodian border. To the Vietnamese this 
place was known as the Tay Ninh province, but Russell rebrands it Mole City, a reference 
to the imputed affinity for tactical burrowing of the VC. He speaks of his platoon-mates 
with an author's relish, savoring the features that make them unique and at the same time, 
part of the unit's common identity. Kumo was, "a gifted story-teller who, like an good 
Hawaiian, played the ukulele.” Harry, "our squad leader, was an interesting fellow who 
seems oddly out of place and yet fit in, anyway." Stan "walked around with the swagger 
of a sailor on shore leave." Francis "came without pretensions. He was an aboriginal 
Bubba with a barrel chest and a pronounced drawl that was peppered with obscenities. A 
few of us made a bet one at as to who could get Francis to say a sentence without 
swearing. We all lost."179 The amount of detail he provides shows that Russell values 
these men for who they are in addition to the function they provide in the war. These 
bonds will be the bedrock upon which he builds what will become for him the social                                                         
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construct of Suicide Charlie. 
 After spending a few days in Tay Ninh, Russell begins to feel an affinity for the 
place. He writes how "Mole City had become my home. As a child, I had always been an 
outsider. Being raised by a widowed mother when two-parent families were the norm 
may have been a factor... The army changed all that. Now I was part of a community of 
men and glad to be in it, considering the alternative."180 This is the value of the company 
for Russell, and likely for many other soldiers like him in Vietnam. It is a place where 
they can feel safe, can feel as though they belong, even in the midst of the miserable 
drudgery and scarring horror of warfare.   
This identity gets annealed after a large firefight, and a subsequent visit by the 
Army brass. Now that Russell has seen the VC, he is exposed to another party in Vietnam 
for whom he has palpable and understandable ill will. After the firefight, Mole City 
becomes the topic of discussion and cachet among the high ranks of the Army:181  
A lot of very important people wanted to check us out, and it would do for them 
to stub their toes. We were about to become a Must See on the Vietnam Tour. 
Admirals, four-star generals, perhaps the very people who sent us here to be 
killed, were coming to gawk at us and marvel at the fact that we were still alive. 
The irony of the situation was obvious. I wouldn't have minded their dropping in 
for the day, if only they'd stayed the night. 
Just as the process of fighting and defending each other contributes to the hardening of 
the bonds between and the strengthening of the identity of the membership of Suicide 
Charlie, this visit by the higher-ups in the military administration serves a similar                                                         
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purpose. This tension causes Russell to retreat more into the haven of his social construct.  
 As a result of this, the company developed its own perceptions of the validity of 
military service. Though they were willing to fight (as we shall soon see with Russell), 
they were not willing to accept the characterizations of their service that the officer class, 
and more importantly the imprimatur of their country’s political institutions, offers. 
Russell remembers how their captain would,182 
[b]efore he set us loose to party, [give] us a good-going-guys-you-earned-it pep 
talk, telling us that we were the most high decorated outfit in Vietnam. Nobody 
was much impressed, medals representing more of a curse than an honor. I don't 
know whether he got his numbers from Guinness or where but, given that a 
congenital coward such as myself had already been decorated twice for valor, 
there may have been some truth to this statement. 
Here we can see how far detached Russell has become from the military hierarchy 
existing above his company. This detachment only drives him closer to the men in his 
unit and the collective identity they have established.  
 This adherence comes to fruition in a Russell’s description of a firefight, in an 
anachronistic passage near the beginning of the memoir. As he and his buddies prepare 
for an assault, they183  
scurry out from our bunker and, for the moment, it is absolutely silent. It is the 
quiet before the thunderclap, the cut before the pain. Time is suspended as we 
wait for the ground attack; then the enemy opens fire and eternity begins… I 
crouch behind my parapet, transfixed by the bloodcry of the dark that comes from                                                         
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beyond the grave. It calls to an ancient tribal memory buried deep in my soul. It is 
the voice of the Devil, screaming. Instinctively, I reach for my rifle. It is time we 
made our acquaintance, the Devil and I. I am an infantryman now. 
Along with his identity as a member of Charlie Company, Russell has also come to 
accept that of an infantryman. To properly adhere to the prescribed group norms of the 
company, which he deems to be very desirable, protecting your buddies during a firefight 
is simply another prescribed behavior. That Russell, a self-diagnosed “congenital 
coward” finds himself able to do this is, I submit, due to SCCT.  
 
To be sure, the bounds of SCCT should not be limited to infantrymen alone. This 
phenomenon is observable in a wide gamut of military positions, all of which have a 
reason to establish a collective identity. Major Michael Andrews served as a Platoon 
Leader for the “Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP), 3rd Brigade, 
25th Infantry Division in Dau Tieng from June of 1968 to June of 1969. This platoon was 
organized specially for the purpose of intelligence gathering.184 Major Andrews had the 
power to select men from other units in the area, which bred an identity of privilege 
amongst those chosen. He remembers there being185 
an awful lot of esprit in the unit for many reasons. One was that it was perceived 
to be a very elite unit. It was different. It was important. I think the soldiers 
perceived that and did a better job, their enthusiasm was a little higher…There 
was a lot of teamwork. People know what to expect from the other person, and 
without question, it was a good hit to be with for that reason.                                                         
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We can see through the example of Maj. Andrews how collective identities were not 
limited to units that saw regular combat, even if they had served in a regular-combat 
capacity before. Rather, the function and prestige of being chosen for a specific company 
seems to have a lot to do with the willingness that the men of the CRIP have when 
performing their military duties.  
 
 
iii. Survey Data 
 
 
We’ve seen the personal accounts, now let’s take another look at some survey 
data. As opposed to Section III, the questions here probe what might be hazier parts of 
these veterans’ memories. As such, they are likely more susceptible to change over time 
and new experience. The first two responses we’ll look at come from the statements: “My 
service was motivated by a desire to defend American and its values,” (#11) and “My 
service was motivated by my family/community.” (#12) 
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Table 2 
 
 
 Infantry n=394 Non-Infantry n=1,084 
Question #11 4.5 6.1 
Question #12 5.9 6.2 
 
 
 
 
These data cohere nicely with the trends pushing young men toward service as 
outlined in section III. There appears to be a sizable difference in initial motivations for 
service between infantry and non-infantry MOS’s. While the latter seem to have an easier 
time putting their service in terms of national duty, the former are more hesitant to do so.  
However, let’s take a look at how these motivations compare with the 
socialization processes that came only as a condition of service itself: basic training and 
service in the field. This next set of data come from responses to the following two 
statements: “My service was motivated by the people I went through training with,” (#13) 
and “My service was motivated by the men in my unit” (#14).  
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Table 3 
 
 
 Infantry n=394 Non-Infantry n=1,084 
Question #13 5.2 4.8 
Question #14 6.5 4.3 
 
 
 
 
These data seem to demonstrate that the average infantryman’s motivation for 
service increased as he became more familiar with fellow service men through training 
and experience in the field. On the other hand, these same types of motivations seem to 
be, if not lacking, than certainly less potent among non-infantry servicemen. It must be 
mentioned however that these responses are based on memories that are in some cases 
almost 50 years old. They may well have been changed by a kind of ‘distortive amnesia’. 
What the data associated with survey questions #11-#14 demonstrate is an 
interesting difference between infantry and non-infantry servicemen in the Vietnam War. 
Overall, it suggests the motivation for service was initially lower for those who would 
become infantrymen than it was for those who wouldn’t. As they became socialized 
through the process of training and through the process of fighting alongside their 
platoon-mates, only then did they find more satisfying reasons for service. This does not 
mean to imply that they began also to approve of the war’s moral underpinnings or the 
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ways in which it was being prosecuted (as we’ve seen above perhaps the opposite is true), 
but simply that they had more compelling reasons for consenting to their service; namely, 
the men with whom they served and with whom they developed deep, nurturing, and 
oftentimes tragically short relationships. In contrast, those who did not serve in positions 
with regular combat seem to have relied more on their desire to uphold the values of the 
families and communities from which they have come. Since they were not disposed 
towards the kind of bonds forged in the heat of combat, their fellow servicemen do not 
play the same role as those of Infantrymen.  
In his book Against the Tide, Lieutenant Colonel Peter B. Petersen, presents data 
supporting the conclusion presented in this section. He too compares “combat soldiers” to 
“headquarters soldiers” along many different criteria, testing both groups while in 
country and then again approximately 1 year after their discharges. When asking about 
each group’s “preferences for social interaction,” Petersen found that each group 
underwent a precipitous drop from their in-country level.186 With respect to all of the data 
he lists, Petersen finds that “after they returned to the United States, the same group of 
individuals, when they were stationed as infantrymen in Vietnam, placed a significantly 
higher value on the approval from others, on social interaction, and on group 
participation.”187 
In Fields of Fire, James Webb captures these sentiments nicely in describing the 
experience of a veteran returning home to an acutely unwelcome welcome home 
                                                        
186 Petersen, Against the Tide, 172. This initial level of “preference for social interaction,” taken while in 
country for both groups, was not very high to begin with and dropped considerably afterwards (from -3 to -
46 for combat soldiers, and from -6 to -24 for headquarters soldiers) 
187 Petersen, Against the Tide, 173 
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reception:188 
‘Suffering,’ he had told them, with a stone-faced attempt at nobility, ‘is inherently 
undignified when shared.’ They had been sitting in an expectant circle in his 
parents’ living room, his brother and sister and their families, five grade-school 
children between them, two high-school friends, and his parents… ‘Oh, God,’ he 
had mumbled. ‘Oh, no.’ He then turned to his father. ‘Do you really have people 
in there?’ 
While he may well have depended, consciously or not, upon the support of his platoon-
mates while in country, the thought of incorporating his family and friends into this group 
is clearly unwelcome. This is an interesting corollary to the research I have performed, 
and perhaps tells us something more about the effects of SCCT beyond the time a soldier 
spends in country.  
 
 
iv. Conclusion 
 
 
The biggest lesson to take away from this project is that war is first and foremost 
a social phenomenon for the people who actually do the fighting – these men did not 
serve in a vacuum. Thus, there willingness to follow orders should not be interpreted as 
an avowal of the overarching political agenda of their country. Just as military service is 
meant to condition them into the young men of tomorrow, their actual experiences in the 
                                                        
188 Webb, Fields of Fire, 322 
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field condition them to accept the hardships of war through a shared identity and 
friendship with their buddies (however, as Petersen’s research demonstrates, this does not 
translate into their postwar lives). This safety net makes it easier for those who had the 
toughest jobs in Vietnam to get through their tours and return home. Therefore, it makes 
it more difficult to level criticism against them for supporting the military agenda of the 
government that sent them to war in the first place. If anything, infantrymen came back 
from their tours with strengthened bonds of friendship, while their relationship with the 
military hierarchy and the war’s general cause soured in many cases.  
This project makes a positive and I believe accurate contribution to the 
understanding of Vietnam veterans, the war in which they fought, and, in a small way, 
military history. By looking closely at the specific motivations of these men, I have 
identified important reasons for their service that might not be clear to the casual 
observer. In coming to understand how wars can be fought for numerous different 
reasons, we can reach a fuller understanding of, and perhaps nurture healthier 
relationships with, the veterans in our society.  
To return to the initial question of the project, the infantrymen surveyed here were 
not ideal consenters in the Zinnian sense. They did not by and large believe that service 
in Vietnam supported a political agenda that cohered with their inner most values and 
principles. Rather, they were subjected to the behavior modifying effects of Social 
Construct Consent Theory, and created networks of friendship and support to make the 
drudgery of warfare less taxing. Understanding these kinds of motivations for fighting in 
war gives us a better sense of the type of consent exhibited by men fighting for their 
countries in general, and we would be remiss to deem it as anything less than a hugely 
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important sociological phenomenon. And this seems entirely appropriate.  
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Appendix A: Participating Chapters of VVA and VFW 
The following chapters of the VVA participated in the survey portion of this project: 
Johnstown, PA; Media, PA; Reading, PA, Valley Forge, PA; Upper Bucks/Lower 
Lehigh, PA; Somerset County, PA; Blair County, PA; Rochester, NY; Glendale, NY; 
Mesquite, TX; Southeast, TX; Houston, TX; Alamo, TX; Dickinson, TX; Hill Country, 
TX; Riverside, CA; Redondo Beach, CA; Santa Barbara, CA; Redding, CA; Oakland, 
CA; Tonkawa, OK 
 
The following chapters of the VFW participated in the survey portion of this project: 
Washington Heights, PA; Angell-Bolen, PA; Bentz-Isles, PA; William Leavell, CA; 
Spring Branch, TX; Jack F. Lee, TX; Fridley, MN; Meles Jain, CO 
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Appendix B: Complete Survey Questions 
1. Were you drafted or did you volunteer for service in the Vietnam War? 
1 (Drafted) 2(Volunteered) 
2. What was your Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)? 
(answers grouped into “infantry” and “non-infantry” categories) 
3. My first tour began on _______ & ended on _______ 
4. Did you volunteer for a 2nd tour? 
1(Yes) 2(No) 
5. My second tour began on _______ & ended on _______ 
6. I am from a military family.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I am from a community where compelled military service is seen as a duty.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I had reservations about enlisting (response only required for draftees).  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I understood the military objective of the United States in South Vietnam before I 
was deployed.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. My service involved relatively frequent contact with enemy forces. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. My service was motivated by a desire to defend America and its values.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12.  “ “    my family.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      13. “ “    the people I went through training with. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      14.  “ “                                           the men in my unit.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. I am proud of my service during the Vietnam War. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. I had a good relationship with my officers. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. I had a high regard for the Vietnamese as people during my service.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I had a high regard for the Vietnamese as soldiers for the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN) during my service.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. I had a high regard for the Vietnamese as Viet Cong (VC) soldiers during my 
service.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. I am unsure of how my service contributed to the aims of the war.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. Knowing what I know now, I would still have served in the Vietnam War.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix C: Complete Survey Results 
 
Survey Responses (1,478 received; 8,694 distributed; ~17% response rate) 
 
Question # Infantry MOS (n=394) Non-Infantry MOS 
(n=1084) 
1 1:112  2:282 1:285  2:799 
2 As above As above 
3 Answers vary Answers vary 
4 1:13  2:381 1:37  2:1,047 
5 Answers vary Answers vary 
6 5.2 6.1 
7 5.8 6.3 
8 5.5 (n=112) 4.5 (n=285) 
9 1.9 2.3 
10 6.6 3.2 
11 4.5 6.1 
12 5.9 6.2 
13 5.2 4.8 
14 6.5 4.3 
15 6.3 6.1 
16 4.8 5.8 
17 3.8 4.3 
18 2.0 3.3 
19 1.6 2.1 
20 6.2 5.6 
21 5.3 6.4 
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